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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CONTENTS

AFRICAN OIL EXPLORATION, PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION SURVEYED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 May 80 pp 61, 63, 65, 67, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 82-83, 85, 92-93

[Article: "African Oil"]

[Text] If we had to sum up in one sentence the detailed report on African oil we are submitting to JEUNE AFRIQUE's readers in this issue, we would say: African oil is still for the most part undiscovered.

Indeed, as might well be expected, the oil that has been exploited to date was the easiest to discover and also the least expensive. But ever since the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973, and especially after the more recent price increases, a new geography of African oil has been emerging, a geography that could radically change not only the continent's economy but its politics as well.

The first measures taken after the 1973 "crisis" are already starting to yield results. Such is the case notably in Egypt, Tunisia, Cameroon, and Ivory Coast. But the deposits discovered there are small and located near or within areas already known to prospectors. These deposits are, of course, not insignificant in the view of most of the countries concerned because these countries are small and have energy needs proportionate to their size. Even though the expected output of these deposits is relatively low, it will, nevertheless, enable these countries to be self-sufficient, or indeed even to export a slight amount of their production. This capability will greatly enhance their balance of payments situation. There is even a possibility that one of the most recent deposits discovered in Cameroon may produce a "most pleasant surprise." But the experts are being cautious and do not want to count their chickens before they hatch.

Nevertheless, the great African oil adventure still lies ahead of us. It has every chance of occurring in Niger, Chad, and Zaire, provided there is the right combination of economic conditions. We use the word "adventure" advisedly, because at the present time nothing is certain as yet. But this uncertainty has to at least be dispelled. Likewise another "miracle" could

could emerge out of the "deep" offshore waters, i.e. at a depth of more than 200 meters, and this time all of the coastal countries from Dakar to Cape Town could perhaps benefit therefrom.

Yet oil is not solely a matter of geology. Here in Africa it is a tremendously important and highly subtle game played by the great powers, the oil companies, and the African states, a game in which anything goes.

It is a gigantic "poker game" in which chance plays a considerable part. We have tried to describe this game by providing the maximum amount of information. This information, however, has not always been easy to obtain.

Wandering Continents

Some 150 million years ago, a tourist could have travelled from Lagos to Rio de Janeiro exclusively by land, provided those two cities had existed then. But much before these cities even had a chance to be founded, that area of the world which much later became known as Latin America began to break away from the enormous African land mass and started drifting. Unfortunately no Rimbaud was available at the time to describe in poetic language the delirium of that huge "drunken boat." [Reference to Rimbaud's poem, "he Bateau Ivre" (Drunken Boat)]. What god will someday put these pieces of the puzzle back together, pieces scattered as if by a child's hand? It looks as if peoples crossed the ocean in order to efface this scattering of entire continents.

This break up into continents was most fortunate indeed, because thanks to it we may one day find oil in the deep African seas. Yet the surgeon who operated some 100 million years ago must have skillfully wielded his scalpel.

As depicted in the sketch below, the continental drift process occurred in three phases. During the first phase, the two continents [Africa and South America] remained connected by what geologists today call the Rio Grande-Walvis rise ("ride"), the Falkland-Agulhas rise. The waters rushing into the gap remained confined within the Brazil-Angola Basin and the Cape-Argentine Basin. This confinement was essential in that it protected the sea bottom from being churned by ocean currents, kept deposits of organic matter from oxidizing, and allowed the formation of source rocks containing hydrocarbons. This dual confinement lasted 10 million years, from less than 110 million years ago to less than 100 million years ago.

During the second phase the second barrier--Falkland-Agulhas rise--unfortunately collapsed under the pressure of the ocean and thus opened the Cape-Argentine Basin to the ocean. Deep ocean currents convulsed the sea bottom, thereby destroying the valuable source rocks that were still in the formation stage. But luckily the first barrier--the Rio Grande-Walvis rise--withstood the ocean pressure and the deposits forming within the

Brazil-Angola Basin had an additional 20 million years in which to develop: from the 100 millionth year to the 80th million year. Hence what was possibly the greatest ecological disaster of all time was not total.

Yet--and this was the third phase in this prehistoric process--there came a time when the Rio Grande-Walvis rise also yielded and thereby opened the Brazil-Angola Basin to the ocean. During a period of some 10 million years--from the 80 millionth year to the 70 millionth year--the South Atlantic Ocean definitively separated America from Africa. But this upheaval came too late to destroy the source rocks, or at least those that had formed close to the coasts. And that is why there is excellent hope of finding oil along the African coast and likewise along the coast of Brazil and Argentina.

Africa's Undiscovered Oil

That deep-sea oil which lies more than 200 meters below the surface of the sea is the oil of tomorrow. All coastal African countries can expect to profit therefrom. But technology still has to make this possible. Current technology permits exploiting only shallow off-shore deposits, i.e. those less than 200 meters under the water. Furthermore, such exploitation has to be a paying proposition. At 30 dollars a barrel, the price of oil is undoubtedly still not high enough to enable governments and oil companies to begin this new adventure, other than on a strictly experimental basis.

For the near future, however, Africa has other substantial assets. But experts totally disagree, on these assets. Results of a survey conducted by the French Petroleum Institute are significant in this respect. Estimates by experts the institute questioned about "the ultimate recoverable oil resources" vary for sub-Saharan Africa alone from 2.3 billion tons for the most pessimistic of the experts to 40 billion tons for the most optimistic.

This is a considerable margin of error. It is even greater when we compare these figures with annual African oil production which is, year in and year out, slightly less than 300 million tons, half of which is from south of the Sahara. According to the most pessimistic estimate, sub-Saharan Africa has only 20 years of production ahead of it, whereas the most optimistic estimate is that there are 270 years of production remaining.

Where does the truth lie? If only we could compute the average of the estimates given by the experts and count on that average as the most probable figure! But this is precisely what we cannot do, because each one of these estimates has the same chance of being true. Not to mention the fact that they are not all independent one from the other. In addition, the reference price used by the French Petroleum Institute was 20 dollars per barrel (1976). That price can now be considered out of date, even if we take into account the inflationary pressure which has eroded the value of the American dollar since 1976. But revising the reference price upward tends to give more weight to the optimistic estimates about Africa's reserves.



(10) La dérive des continents

Key:

1. 110 to 100 million years ago
2. Brazil-Angola closed basin
3. Rio Grande-Walvis rise
4. Cape of Good Hope-Argentina closed basin
5. Falkland-Agulhas rise
6. 95 million years ago
7. Open ocean basin
8. 80 to 70 million years ago
9. Open ocean basins
10. Continental Drift Process

It is even more difficult to determine the status of Africa's potential reserves north of the Sahara. Like most other studies, the French Petroleum Institute's survey is of little use on this subject, because it considers North Africa and the Middle East as a single entity. Estimates for this entity vary from one expert to another: 55 billion tons for the least optimistic, 300 billion tons for the most optimistic. Nevertheless, the spread is narrower than for the estimates on sub-Saharan Africa.

Hence the only sure conclusion we can draw from all these expertises is that Africa's oil resources are still largely unknown. If we consider what is already known, the contradictions of the experts--contradictions that are greater for Africa than for any other region of the world--are even less surprising.

Actually there are four major distinguishable oil "provinces" in Africa: the North African bloc (Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt), the Gulf of Guinea, the Chad Basin, and the Zaire Basin. The first two provinces are close to the sea and their resources are relatively well known. The latter two provinces consist of inland basins and are just beginning to be explored.

1. The North African "province"--from which Morocco must be excluded from the geological viewpoint--is not only highly active but still has very large untapped potential reserves. A geologist employed by a large international company told us: "We have not heard the whole story about the Algerian reserves." Then he added, with a touch of humor tinged with bitterness: "If Algeria's exploration programs have not been fruitful, it is because Algerians called upon Soviet technical assistance in that field!"

In Libya, the most recent offshore discoveries have been most encouraging. Although for the past 10 years that country's production has leveled off at between 70 and 100 million tons per year--after having reached a level of 160 million tons in 1970--drilling activity has resumed at a rapid rate since 1977.

As for Egypt, it too is the scene of intense prospecting activity. Figures published by PETROCONSULTANT show that during the first nine months of 1979 that country had the greatest number of active exploratory drilling projects. Egypt's production has also greatly increased these past few years: 12 million tons in 1975, 16-17 million tons in 1976, 21 million in 1977, and 28 million in 1978.

Great Expectations

Tunisia is part of this same oil "province." Although it has had rather disappointing results thus far, this country has been the subject of renewed interest the past few months because the Tunisian offshore area is thought to be as promising as the Libyan offshore area.

2. The second relatively well-known African oil "province" is the Gulf of Guinea region. Centered in Nigeria, this "province" is bounded on the northwest by Benin, Togo, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast, and on the south by Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo, the Angolan exclave of Cabinda, and Angola. It is not by mere chance that the largest deposits were discovered in Nigeria. Most of the deposits are there thanks to nature's prodigious gift of the deltaic region formed by the mouth of the Niger River, a gift which has but few equivalents in the world and none elsewhere in Africa. Discoveries in Cameroon have revealed the southern tip of this magnificent basin that has enabled Nigeria to become a giant oil producer. Its production in 1965 was only 13 million tons, but by 1973 its output had climbed to 100 million tons and has remained at approximately that level ever since. Yet the further one gets from that "magic delta," the more difficult prospecting and exploration conditions become, until in Ivory Coast, for example, such activity demands almost heroic measures.

Despite such difficulties, the efforts made in that area are starting to show results. In the early 1980's, annual production is expected to reach a level of 400,000 tons in Ivory Coast, 500,000 tons in Ghana, 750,000 tons in Benin, 1.4 million tons in Cameroon, and 2.5 million tons in Congo. Angola's annual production will probably have risen to 10 million tons by that time, in other words, to about the same level as Gabon's annual output. If Nigeria were to authorize maximum capacity production (120 million tons), nearly 150 million tons could be extracted from the Gulf of Guinea each year. Even more important than this impressive overall figure is the fact that all the countries we have mentioned will become self-sufficient in oil, if not even net oil exporters. Under these circumstances, it is conceivable that oil may once again excite the most level-headed persons.

3. The virtually unknown oil "provinces" of the Chad and Zaire basins have long stirred the imagination of geologists and explorers. Hence it is not astonishing that discovery of the slightest drop of oil on the borders of Lake Chad receives a great deal of publicity. The fact is that the formative conditions of the Chad Basin, like those of the Zaire Basin, are similar to the conditions which made the Libyan geological miracle possible.

With just a very small amount of imagination, it is really not difficult to picture the possible effects of a discovery in the very heart of Africa of another Libya headed by another Qadhafi. Especially since Chad and Niger, the beneficiaries of this new miracle of nature, have common borders with Libya.

In a June 1978 document outlining new oil prospects in the non-OPEC countries, the French Petroleum Institute credited these same two countries, Niger and Chad, with having the largest "ultimate reserves" in Africa (excluding the African OPEC countries). The reserves for each of these two countries were estimated to be more than 200 million tons. Inasmuch as both countries are not densely populated, one can, in fact, imagine what geopolitical upheavals confirmation of these figures would cause. At the present time, however, these figures are mere estimates.

It is a well-known fact that oil exploration activity has halted in those two countries because of political agitation. Yet we could logically ask ourselves whether indeed the opposite is not true, namely that the political unrest was caused by the oil prospecting activity.

Expensive Surgery

On the other hand, we must not underestimate the logistical difficulties of such prospecting. At 1,500 kilometers and even 2,000 kilometers from the nearest coast, exploration becomes a veritable feat of strength, skill, and ingenuity. Furthermore, it is not enough to discover a small deposit like those found in Ivory Coast or Benin. Considering the transportation costs over such distances and on undeveloped roads or trails, the few barrels that could be extracted would be nonexportable. In addition, they would not be numerous enough to warrant constructing an on-site refinery, at least according to ordinary profitability standards. In other words, Niger and Chad will become oil producers only if they produce it in large quantity. The very fact of their distance from the coasts makes only large-scale production feasible for them. Hence the importance of political conditions in those countries. The same may be said of Zaire, other things being equal.

Geologists themselves acknowledge that theirs is not an exact science. The parameters that have to be considered are extremely numerous. And for each case it is very difficult to distinguish the "critical parameters," i.e. those which must be given preferential consideration. Geologists are often obliged to reason from analogy: a certain terrain displays the same characteristics as another that has already proved to be a sponge of oil, for example, the Lake Chad Basin is comparable to the Sirte Basin in Libya, a basin which, incidentally, was discovered practically by accident. Consequently, geologists should normally expect to find a new oil "province" in the Lake Chad Basin. Such reasoning is extremely dangerous, however, And until there has been exploratory drilling, nothing is ever certain. The geologist is like a doctor who cannot rely solely upon auscultation and is obliged for each diagnosis to become a surgeon. But surgery (i.e. exploratory drilling) in the heart of Africa is 50 times more expensive than in the United States.

Refining, Distribution, and Nationalization

"To live blissfully, we must live hidden from view. We seek no publicity. We do our work and want to be judged on the basis of our work." The person who told us this is his company's executive responsible for supplying oil to almost all of French-speaking Africa. His company is one of the "Seven Sisters." His headquarters is on the top floor of one of the La Defense tower buildings from which a person can view the immense panorama of Paris. Through the mist, we could make out the Arc de Triomphe and Montmartre. It was a gloomy day. The French capital seemed to be prostrate and stagnant. As if to illustrate this impression, the executive murmured: "What a difference from Africa, at least from the marketing viewpoint! Here consumption of petroleum products is at a standstill and we expect no improvement whatever for the next few years. For my colleagues who handle marketing in Europe, it's somewhat depressing and especially difficult. In Africa, on the other hand, we foresee an annual increase of 7 to 8 percent in the demand for petroleum products during the 1980's. That's because we are starting from a very low level and this demand involves vital needs. At such a level it is inconceivable that people will be rationed. Rationing is good for Europe. Africa, however, has not experienced the "crisis" and "will not do so."

The figures back up the oil executive's opinion. African consumption of petroleum products has indeed steadily increased these past few years despite the quadrupling of the price of crude. That consumption rose from 42 million tons in 1970 to 64 million tons in 1979. This progression is even more remarkable in that these figures include South Africa's consumption (15 million tons) which has declined because of the crisis.

As may be expected, this continuous growth in the demand for petroleum products is swamping existing support facilities. Our "oilman" confirmed that "the refineries in Dakar (Senegal), Abidjan (Ivory Coast), and Port-Gentil (Gabon) are no longer able to satisfy market requirements. These are the principal refineries in West Africa and Equatorial Africa, and also those on which countries in the interior depend for their supplies."

He then explained: "The Dakar refinery was built by the companies, with the Senegalese Government acquiring a 10 percent interest therein. It has an annual capacity of 850,000 tons. Market demand, however, is for an additional 100,000 to 150,000 tons of refined products, and these have to be imported directly. The current policy of the authorities in Dakar is not to oust foreign countries but to allow them a sort of supervised operating freedom. It is somewhat the same system as in France.

"The supply process is one of 'purchase and sale,' to use the British and American term. This means that we, the oil companies, sell crude to the refining company and our local subsidiaries purchase the finished product and handle its distribution. The government may also participate in supplying the crude whenever it can obtain oil at more favorable terms of payment. I do not refer to discount prices, because OPEC gives no discounts, but to credit terms that are slightly less expensive than those in the international money market and that are related to oil purchases. The Islamic Development Bank, for example, grants this type of loan. Iran likewise was, at one time, interested in Senegal on Islamic grounds."

Matter of Philosophy

Our oil executive added: "The situation in Abidjan is a bit different to the extent that the government has acquired a much larger interest in the refining company. Distribution of refined products is not state-controlled, but the Ivorian Petroleum Company, PETROCI, is trying to establish its own distribution network that is still only a very small network.

"In this connection, it should be noted that the Ivorian authorities have benefited from the fact that the major oil companies did not have the same policy on the issue of governmental participation. Some of them, Shell and British Petroleum (BP), agreed to 50 percent state participation in their local distribution subsidiaries, Shell-Ivory Coast and BP-Ivory Coast. So the Ivorian Government holds a 50 percent interest in each of these subsidiaries. Conversely, Mobil and Total have retained 100 percent control of their local subsidiaries."

As our "oilman" explained it, each of these two approaches has its advantages and disadvantages. The first approach--50 percent governmental participation--provides privileged access to governmental markets. Furthermore, this seminationalization may possibly serve as a shield against ultimate full nationalization. The disadvantages of this approach are that the companies are no longer masters of their subsidiaries and must share half of their dividends. In addition, whenever the companies have to invest funds in modernizing or expanding their facilities, they have to convince the government authorities to share in these capital expenditures, and that is no easy task. "As you know," the executive remarked, "there are not many people in Africa who work on a long-term basis."

Adherents of the second approach are in the exactly opposite situation: the oil companies are masters of their subsidiaries and encounter less management difficulties. But they may be at a disadvantage in obtaining government contracts and may also fear ultimate 100 percent nationalization.

Consequently how is one to choose between the two approaches? Our "oilman" diffidently replied: "It's almost a matter of philosophy and temperament. All things considered, everything depends on how one views the long-range future of these countries and the risks one is determined to take in that future's interest."

Seven Sisters

In any case, the Abidjan refinery's capacity is to be increased from 2 to 4 million tons. This is a large-scale project in that it will include the last word in hydrocrackers, an apparatus that will make it possible to absorb current and future surpluses of heavy fuel oils. The entire project calls for a capital investment of 100 million CFA francs. It will also permit laying the foundations of a petrochemical industry.

The third large refinery on the coast is at Port-Gentil, Gabon. It has an annual capacity of 850 million tons. All of its stock is owned by Elf and Shell. There are no plans at present to enlarge the refinery. On the other hand, a refinery is to be built at Victoria in Cameroon, a country where something important may be about to happen.

The problem in the inland countries is altogether different, because there is no thought of installing refineries there at this time. The level of petroleum products consumption is such that refineries would not be a paying proposition. Our "oilman" explained: "Our capital investment in those countries consists mainly of storage tanks and trucks. Our main problem is avoiding running out of stock. Believe me, this demands a rather complex logistical system. Especially since transportation costs are enormous."

How are the big oil companies perceived in Africa? According to our "oilman," their refining and distribution activities show a "comfortable" margin of profit. When asked if there are ever any "oil scandals" such as those uncovered in the United States and Europe from time to time, he replied: "Our subsidiaries are companies incorporated under local laws. As a rule, 100 percent of their employees are African. In my opinion, there is no fear of nationalization, unless there are very serious political disorders.

In any case, such upheavals are unforeseeable. If we look at things solely from the economic viewpoint, we need have no fear of being ousted from any country. And all the more so because there is the deterrent example of those countries which did nationalize and ended up in disaster: Zaire, Central African Republic, and Congo. In the Congo, for example, the refinery built at Pointe Noir is just simply not functioning. As a result, the Congolese are now wondering how to go about calling upon the oil companies to help them once again. The same is true with the Zairians. These disastrous examples have made their point and the sensible countries have clearly realized that it is better, in their enlightened self-interest, to remain associated with us."

The same view was expressed by the executive in charge of exploration for one of the other Seven Sisters. He said: "Our job is to search for oil. We need to be encouraged by geological and not political considerations. What we consider to be crucial is the constitution or reconstitution of oil reserves. Consequently, we do our utmost to achieve that objective."

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"But this oil you discover," we emphasized, "you are liable to have it confiscated once it actually starts to flow." He retorted: "Of course, but it is even less useful not to find any oil at all."

Thus in oil refining, distribution, and exploration, the companies operating in Africa appear to be self-confident (and domineering?). They know they are indispensable. They are prudent. They carefully nurture their public image. And we cannot avoid noting that they are returning to those very countries from which they were earlier expelled.

Consumption and Distribution in 12 African Countries

Increasing Consumption

The leading consumers of petroleum products (gasoline, kerosene, gas oil, and diesel fuel) in our sample of 12 African countries are Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Senegal, Cameroon, and Gabon.

For the first time ever, consumption in Ivory Coast reportedly rose in 1979 from 8 to 12 percent depending on the product. In Gabon, it rose from 2 to 9 percent.

Despite successive price increases, conservation efforts have generally been very insignificant. From 1977 to 1979, only three countries reduced their consumption of gas oil and diesel fuel: Gabon (-10 percent), Mauritania (-7 percent), and Togo (-6 percent). But the latter two countries considerably increased their consumption of jerosene and gasoline: 24 and 19 percent for Mauritania, 16 and 20 percent for Togo.

Gasoline consumption rose moderately in three countries: Chad (6 percent), Tunisia (7 percent), and Senegal (9 percent). But much higher increases in consumption of the same product were recorded in Cameroon (29 percent), Upper Volta (27 percent), Gambia (24 percent), Niger (22 percent), and Ivory Coast (21 percent).

The greatest increases in kerosene consumption were recorded in Niger (38 percent), Cameroon (35 percent), Gambia (31 percent), Ivory Coast (28 percent), and Mauritania (24 percent). The lowest increases were in Gabon (1 percent), Upper Volta (4 percent), Tunisia (9 percent), and Mali (10 percent).

Gas oil and diesel fuel consumption rose 51 percent in Niger, 37 percent in Gambia, 28 percent in Tunisia, Upper Volta, and Ivory Coast, and 25 percent in Mali.

Oil Companies and the Market

Mobil ranks as the leading oil company in the domestic markets of our sample of 12 African countries. Such is the finding of an analysis of 1978 statistical data on consumption of petroleum products.

Mobil leads some 10 oil companies by supplying the largest number of countries at least 20 percent of the products they consume. It is followed by Shell, British Petroleum, Total, Texaco, and Esso. The other companies include Fina and Elf. The latter operates solely in Gabon.

Mobil is the leading supplier of aviation gasoline. Eight countries purchase 25 to 100 percent of their consumption from it. These include: Ivory Coast (25 percent), Gabon (33 percent), Niger and Mali (72 percent), Togo and Upper Volta (100 percent).

British Petroleum maintains a very good position in the gas oil and diesel fuel markets. Six countries buy 25 to 49 percent of their consumption from it. These include: Ivory Coast (25 percent), Mali (36 percent), Upper Volta (38 percent), and Gambia (49 percent).

Shell is an equally good position in the kerosene market (23 to 26 percent in four countries) and in the aviation gasoline market (22 to 100 percent in five countries). Texaco holds a good position only in the kerosene market. It supplies 21 to 26 percent of the domestic kerosene consumption in four countries.

Lastly, Esso's best standing is in aviation gasoline sales: 26 to 46 percent in three African markets.

Oil and a Continental Policy

On paper, Africa has no oil problem. The continent's combined production greatly exceeds its current requirements. One figure is enough to illustrate this fact: the consumption of African nonoil-producing countries is not more than 10 million tons, or 4 percent of total African production. And all oil-producing countries are, in varying degrees, net exporters and hence self-sufficient.

The trouble, however, is that Africa as a homogeneous economic space--or one in the process of becoming homogeneous--exists only on paper, and even such existence is questionable. With the result that any attempt to make an overall approximation quickly proves to be ridiculous.

The first point it is particularly important to bear in mind is that the continent as a whole is still closely tied to the economic system established during the colonial era, a basic system of trade that consisted in exchanging low-value manufactured goods for local products. Everywhere in Africa, countries are primarily engaged in the export-import trade. They sell their raw materials--mineral or vegetable, unmanufactured or semimanufactured, and incorporating more or less value added locally--and they import what they need: food products, capital goods, etc. These exchanges will perhaps lead one day to the emergence of veritable national or multinational industries capable of covering the needs of expanded domestic markets. This is possible, but Africa has not yet reached that stage, even though some progress in that direction can be noted, especially in the three countries of the Maghreb.

The second point is just as important as the first. It is that this trading activity is mainly with the industrialized countries. How could it be otherwise at the present time? The industrialized countries are the demanders of the raw materials offered and they also have the goods Africa desires. The major African market is the port, a fact which accounts for the tragedy of landlocked countries.

There is no modern inter-African trade. Such trade represents scarcely 5 percent of the international trade of the countries concerned. On the other hand, there is some traditional inter-African trade: caravan routes, speculation on grain crops, secondary traffic in oxen and cola nuts, diamond smuggling, and more recently, marijuana smuggling. But by definition, there are no statistics or taxes on these trade activities. They are more the relic of outmoded systems than the emergence of new forms.

Oil is no exception to this very specific conjuncture. It is handled like any other natural resource (copper, iron, phosphates, etc.). Except that at the same time, it represents a necessary consumer good. Having oil does not mean merely being able to sell it. It also means not needing to buy it.

The refinery question is highly characteristic of the absence of an oil policy at the continental level. Each country, oil-producing or nonproducing, wants its own refinery. The average capacity of each one of these refineries is approximately 1 million tons. Yet it is an established fact that a refinery of that size is not economically viable, especially when, as is the case in Congo-Brazzaville, the lack of technicians precludes putting the plant into operation. In Africa, there is not one single refinery operated as a cooperative venture by several countries. This cooperative approach has been used for cement, in Togo for example, but not for oil. The only possible explanation is that oil is a sensitive product involving considerations of national independence. If such is indeed the case, then this situation is indicative of the level of mistrust that currently prevails in inter-African relations. Each country in Africa fears the other African countries and has no desire to become too closely linked to them on vital matters. The African petroleum industry consists solely of individual cases that are, in fact, coordinated by the major oil companies.

Another characteristic of the African petroleum industry is that it has three countries that are medium-size producers (medium-size on the international scale, of course), Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria (50 to 114 million tons), and six countries that are small producers (1 to 25 million tons). But this division into two distinct groups is only very partially indicative of the real situation.

[redacted]

Libya is unquestionably No 1 both by the size of its reserves as well as its production capacity. The country's chief characteristic is that it consists mostly of arid desert and has a population of less than 3 million. This weakness is a factor of strength, however: each Libyan has the income from approximately 55 tons of oil per year and Colonel Qadhafi has a considerable financial surplus that enables him, inter alia, to support his foreign policy and maintain a large army. Libya is the only African country to which oil has given a certain degree of external power.

Nigeria has a population of 67 million and a per capita oil production of 1.4 tons. But here everything changes. What is a "gold mine" north of the Sahara becomes merely a valuable supplement in the tropics, but a supplement that is insufficient to alter fundamentally the state of affairs. Especially since the battle over distribution of oil revenues does not facilitate managing a country which, moreover, is suffering from an alarming drop in agricultural production (cocoa, peanuts, palm oil, etc).

Changing Living Conditions

Algeria is the smallest of Africa's three major oil-producing countries, with an annual production of 57 million tons compared with 95 million tons in each of the other two countries. But its ratio of production to population is better than Nigeria's. With a population of 18 million, Algeria has a per capita production of 3.17 tons. On the other hand, its reserves are small--15 years of oil at the present rate of production--and the chances of any new discoveries are almost nil. For this reason, Algeria has chosen to allocate its oil revenues to a program of accelerated industrialization capable of supporting the national economy after the oil runs out. The results of this policy are controversial. Will it, therefore, be continued? Up to now in any case, Algeria has had no financial surpluses and its national oil company, SONATRACH, the only one of its kind on the African continent, has practically never taken action outside of its own establishment, except in the case of a few refineries.

Among the small producers (11 million tons), Gabon holds a place apart because of its small population. Its production to population ratio is about 20 tons, a substantial figure as it is. This wealth coupled with its uranium, manganese, and lumbering permit the country to live very well on its income without worrying too much about the future. But Gabon is actually a sort of principality, an enclave of prosperity in the midst of poverty-stricken surroundings. Yet even if Gabon wanted, it has neither the material nor human resources to play an important role at the inter-African level.

As for the others--Egypt, Tunisia, Congo, and Angola--their production is either too small to be really significant, as is the Congo's case, or their population, like Egypt's, is too large for oil to "change living conditions" at the present level of production.

Lastly there is the case of Cameroon. Deposits have been discovered there but their exact size is still unknown. There has been some talk of a possible production of 10 million tons, or 1.25 ton per each one of Cameroon's 8 million inhabitants. This would certainly be a positive development for the country, but not a decisive one. Other experts have called these deposits a veritable "gold mine": 50 million or indeed even 100 million tons, i.e. between 6 and 12 tons per capita.

Let us dwell for a moment on that last figure, not so as to give countenance to it, but in an attempt to imagine what would happen should that figure materialize. For the first time, we would see emerge in Tropical Africa a geographically well-placed country with sufficiently diversified natural resources, a country that would at the same time become a financial power. Such an emergence would probably bring about a new political balance in West and Central Africa, because Cameroon is at the junction of those two regions. The Cameroon-Chad axis extending up to the Libyan border would see its strategic power substantially enhanced.

Illusions

Would Cameroonians then take advantage of their new power to propose creation, at OAU level, of an inter-African oil consortium responsible for managing a small percentage of continental production in the interest of those countries in the nonproducing areas? Establishment of such a consortium would be doubly beneficial. It would solve the oil bill problem of the poorest countries and make it possible to lay the foundations of a future African oil company, the current nonexistence of which is a serious shortcoming.

A narrow view of national self-interest has thus far blocked any move in this direction despite the fact that it is the way to creation of a real African economic space. The oil market's present structure results in anonymous collection of oil by the major oil companies and a redistribution that is just as anonymous, with all equilibrating readjustments being made at a strictly commercial level. This structure rules out any solution other than creation of an African oil consortium. Africa can be sovereign in this field only if it succeeds in attaining the same degree of integration as the competition. When will we have an African oil authority capable of undertaking such a project? As we have seen, no such authority exists today.

The Old and the New

No less than 17 African countries are considered to be potential producers of oil or natural gas. Those countries are listed in Table 1 at the end of this article. This table was prepared from statistics published by the World Bank. Significantly, Cameroon does not appear on this list, a fact that shows just how quickly things can change in this field. The discovery of a large natural gas field in offshore Cameroon did occur, in fact, after compilation of the data in Table 1.

In spite of these potentialities, which after all are far from being all exploitable, African oil and natural gas resources remain unequally distributed, especially when considered in relation to the respective population figures of the different countries.

None of the countries considered to be without domestic resources have large populations. The most populated of these countries is Upper Volta with its 6.2 million inhabitants. Yet on the other hand, the most heavily populated countries are far from all being the most richly endowed with "black gold." Admittedly nature has been relatively generous to Nigeria which produces 100 million tons of crude oil per year, but its population of 80 million makes it the continent's demographic giant. Similarly the 18 million Algerians are not too poorly off, particularly when considering their country's rich natural gas resources. But what about the 40 million Egyptians, 26 million Zairians, 29 million Ethiopians, and 16 million Sudanese? Even though there is possible hope for fruitful prospecting in each of these nations, they are currently victims of nature's stinginess.

Compared with the aforementioned populations, the inhabitants of Gabon, and particularly of Libya, appear to be especially privileged by the fortunes of geology and oil exploration. Gabon produces 10 million tons for a population of 500,000. Libya produces 10 times as much for a population of 3 million. Libya is, therefore, the only country really comparable to the "miraculous" oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf.

Paradox

Strictly speaking, most African countries have such small populations that a small level of production would be enough to make them self-sufficient in energy. Of the 34 nations listed in Table 1, 26 have a population of less than 15 million, and 17 have a population of less than 6 million. But this Balkanization, this parceling out of Africa has one drawback: energy-related capital investment, particularly in oil prospecting, exploration, and production, is uncertain and costly. Such costs can be borne better when they can be spread over a large population. The table clearly shows that many of those lightly populated countries are currently still incapable of importing crude oil (note the number of zeros in the table's first two columns).

These countries are obliged, therefore, to import already processed products, because a refinery on their territory is not an economically viable option at this time. Noteworthy in this connection is the advantage possessed by countries with access to the sea, because transport by ship costs a great deal less than by road. This explains why a number of these coastal countries, even when not oil producers, are net exporters of refined products--see minus signs in 3d and 4th columns of the table--because they refine oil for others, and in this way refining does become profitable.

If we now total these different import and production figures, we can bring out the paradox of African oil even more clearly. Africa as a whole produces nearly five times more oil than it consumes. If this oil were equally distributed or else if Africa constituted but one and the same nation, there would be no oil problem in Africa. The same paradox applies to Africa's total energy balance.

Operations of Large and Small Oil Companies

All of the large oil companies have operations in Africa. All of them participate in African oil exploration, production, refining, and distribution activities.

At the present time, however, their African operations are but a small part of their total worldwide activities. To measure that part, we are actually obliged to use the data compiled by the Chase Manhattan Bank which publishes a yearly economic and financial study of the world petroleum industry.

The most recently published data show the geographical distribution of expenditures by the companies for geological and geophysical surveys in 1977. This information is an excellent indicator of their oil exploration efforts. That geographical distribution, in millions of dollars, is as follows: United States, 1,645; Canada, 450; Venezuela, 50; other Western Hemisphere countries, 150; Western Europe, 450; Africa, 300; Middle East, 125; and Far East, 225.

Thus, according to these figures, in 1977 the oil companied allocated less than one-tenth of their world geological and geophysical survey budget to exploration of the African continent (including South Africa), and less than a fifth of what they spent on exploration in the United States alone. Nevertheless, this figure of 300 million dollars is rather favorable to Africa, and it has certainly increased since 1977. Africa's share of the world petroleum industry's total capital expenditures is even much smaller: 3.8 billion dollars versus 65 billion dollars for the entire world (1977 figures), or about 20 percent. Another noteworthy point is that two years ago exploration outlays for Africa had already exceeded outlays for the Middle East (only 125 million dollars).

In Table 2 at the end of this article, we have attempted to depict the way the major oil companies have shared the risks of exploration and production in Africa. It will be noted immediately that the countries in which foreign companies have explored and drilled the most are the oil-exporting countries: Nigeria, Libya, and Gabon. Algeria, however, is an exception to this situation, because that country is known to have taken almost complete control of all exploitation of its mineral resources.

Also noteworthy is the special interest shown by the companies not only in countries like Angola, Cameroon, and Tunisia, countries which have shown themselves to be medium-size oil producers, but also in Kenya, Morocco, Somalia, and Zaire where prospecting has been quite disappointing up to now. On the other hand, the major companies have rather neglected Chad and Niger which are at least as promising as Zaire.

Gamble on the Future

According to Table 2, British Petroleum is without doubt the least African of the Seven Sisters. It had established itself in only one country, but admittedly that country is an oil giant, namely Nigeria. Bad luck for BP, however: it was recently nationalized by the Nigerian Government, along with Shell, the other sister that had taken an interest in that country.

Mobil's exploration activity is relatively limited. On the other hand, as we showed earlier, that company does play a most important part in refining and distribution operations throughout West Africa. The other sisters are all well represented, with a marked preference for the best known oil "provinces," Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt on the one hand, and the Gulf of Guinea on the other. It will be noted, however, that the leading sister, Exxon, having arrived after the others and probably too late, had to make shift with Ivory Coast and its small deposits. Yet in dealing with the Ivorian deposits, Exxon had to display remarkable perseverance. After drilling three successive dry holes, Elf of France, a partner in the operation, withdrew from the project. But Elf had cause to regret its action, because the fourth well brought in oil. Shell, the most African of the Seven Sisters, also held on, though it did reduce its participation somewhat. The result is quite paradoxical: Ivory Coast, Africa's most "Frenchified" country, now owes its oil to Exxon, the all-powerful multinational company par excellence.

It is true, however, that the French companies, CFP and Elf, did do considerable work in other countries and consequently are on a par--this is especially true of Elf--with their infinitely more powerful big sisters. It must be noted, however, that the effort of each French company is comparable to that made by the Italian company ENI that has made its presence felt particularly in North Africa.

Two other companies--known as "independents" because they do not belong to the Seven Sisters club--have succeeded in penetrating Africa. The fruit is Occidental whose fortune stems from its miraculous discoveries in Libya, but which is also established in Angola and Niger. The second is Continental, the only company to have taken the risk of being an "operator" in Chad. It has also tried its luck in Tunisia and the Western Sahara. Its efforts in Chad and the Western Sahara, are totally compromised for the moment because of the political difficulties in those areas. But Continental's very risky gamble on the future may well prove to be profitable in the long run.

Table 1

AFRICAN NON-OPEC COUNTRIES

	Crude Oil Imports		Net Imports of Petroleum Products		Domestic Production of Crude & Nat.Gas		Population (in millions)
	(in millions of metric tons)						
	1972	1976	1972	1976	1972	1976	
Oil or Natural Gas Producers							
Cameroon	0	0	0.26	0.31	0	0	7.6
Morocco	4.76	2.63	0.05	0.1	0.03	0.08	17.8
Potential Oil or Natural Gas Producers (-: net exporter)							
Benin	0	0	0.12	0.10	0	0	3.2
Cent. African Rep.							
Chad							
Ethiopia	0.6	0.5	-0.16	-0.2	0	0	28.7
Ghana							
Guinea							
Ivory Coast							
Kenya							
Madagascar							
Malawi							
Mali							
Mauritania							
Mozambique							
Niger							
Senegal							
Sudan							
Tanzania							
Uganda	0	0	0.4	0.3	0	0	11.9
Countries Without Domestic Resources							
Burundi	0	0	0.12	0.02	0	0	3.9
Gambia							
Mauritius							
Rwanda							
Upper Volta	0	0	0.06	0.07	0	0	6.2
Net Exporters of Oil and/or Natural Gas							
Angola	6.8	3.8	-0.1	0.05	7.1	4.5	5.5
Congo							
Egypt							
Tunisia							
Zaire							

Table 1 (continued)

AFRICAN OPEC COUNTRIES

	Crude and Natural Gas Production (in millions of metric tons)		Exports		Population
	1972	1976	1972	1976	
Algeria	49	52	47	46	18.3
Libya	106	94	106	89	2.9
Gabon	6.1	11	5.8	10	
Nigeria	82	100	80	98	78.5



[Best reproduction available]

Key:

1. Oil in Africa
2. Exploration and prospecting areas
3. Crude oil deposits
4. Operational refineries
5. Refineries under construction or planned
6. Crude oil production



Key:

1. Oil-producing areas

Africa's oil fields were still highly concentrated in 1979. The fact that the Cameroonian deposits lie at the southern tip of the Nigerian basin is clearly shown on this map. Also to be noted is the continuity of the Gabon, Congo, Cabinda, and Angola basins.

Table 2

	EXXON	GULF	TEXACO	CHEVRON	MOBIL	BP	SHELL	CONTI-NENTAL	OCCI-DENTAL	CFP (Total)	ELF	ENI (Agip)	PETRO-FINA	TOTAL
Algeria	●									●				2
Tunisia								●		●	●	●		[illegible]
Libya	●			●	●				●	●	●	●		7
Egypt														0
Morocco	●			●							●	●	■	5
Mauritania												●		1
Western Sahara		■						●						2
TOTAL														21
Senegal	■						●							2
Gambia				●			●							2
Mail														0
Guinea										■				1
TOTAL														5
Liberia /Ivory Coast	●						■							2
Ghana							●							1
Benin							●							1
Nigeria		●	●	■	●	●	●				●	●		8
Cameroon		●			●		●			●	●			5
Equatorial Guinea														0
Gabon		●	■	●			■				●			5
Congo											●	●		2
Angola		●	●						■				●	4
TOTAL														28
Niger	■		●											2
Chad				■			■		●					3
Central African Rep.				■			■	●						3
Zaire		●	●		■								●	4
TOTAL														12
Sudan			■	●										2
Ethiopia							●							1
Kenya	■			●						●	■			4
Somalia	■									■	●	●		4
South Africa											●			1
Namibia														0
Madagascar	■											o		2
Total														14
Grand Total	9	6	6	9	4	1	11	3	3	7	10	8	3	

● Country in which the company indicated has an operator role in exploration-production either directly, or indirectly through a subsidiary.

■ Country in which the company indicated is only associated (a partner).

N.B. The above data were compiled mainly from information published by MARCHES TROPICAUX



emplacement des sondes off-shore (1)

(2) *Source : Petroconsultant - Genève (mai 1979)*

Key:

1. Offshore exploratory drilling sites
2. Source: PETROCONSULTANT, Geneva, May 1979

This map shows that exploration in Africa was limited in 1979 to the known "oil provinces": Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt on the one hand, and the Gulf of Guinea on the other, with one notable exception for the southwest coast of South Africa. Nothing was done in 1979 to gain better knowledge of the inland "provinces" (Niger, Chad, and Zaire).

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SIGNIFICANCE OF 'NINE SUMMIT' DISCUSSED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 Apr 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Henri Delahaie]

[Text] The revenues of the countries which just met in Zambia are meager, but joining together their resources and infrastructures would lighten the yoke of imperialism.

On last 1 April the consultations which took place in Lusaka between the 9 independent countries of southern Africa (1), and the decisions taken, bring into view the rough outlines of a preferential economic axis for these countries. The envisaged projects aim at strengthening the integration of the various economies through accelerated development which would reduce their dependence on South Africa.

With the political independence of Zimbabwe, the lock is broken on the economic scene, this country being considered as a turn-table for the region. It is in this new context thus created that the decisions at Lusaka must be viewed.

At the very beginning of this economic community, what do the 9 states represent? What is the credibility of the overall plan? What results could one expect from it? Such are the essential questions to be posed now.

Riches Underground

One thing these countries have in common, as their revenues and populations witness, is their poverty. The average annual per capita income in 1977 ranged between $140 in Malawi to $580 in Swaziland.

But if the yearly resources of the [whole] new economic zone were added together, they would represent more than 40 percent of South Africa's production, which, taking account of that country's economic power, is far from being negligible (2). On the other hand, the total population of these states is double that of the state of apartheid--55 million inhabitants--and it has four times the area. Conditions, however, are quite varied: some states are

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very thinly populated but have a vast territory--Botswana--while others have a large population compared to their geographic extent--Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland.

The economic weight of the respective states concerned should be established, for it can influence future decisions. Angola and Mozambique have between one-fifth and one-fourth of the economic potential; Zimbabwe by itself has close to a quarter; Tanzania and Zambia together have more than 40 percent of this potential. The other states share the remainder.

Southern Africa as a whole hides great mineral wealth and the ground beneath almost all the states is well supplied, prospecting being far from abandoned. What, more precisely, are the strong points of the nine states in the mineral domain? Tanzania and Botswana, for example have the two largest diamond deposits in the world. Zambia produces 10 percent of the world's copper and has 6 percent of the world's reserves of this metal; its cobalt possibilities are of the same importance. Zimbabwe for its part holds more than 20 percent of the world's chromite reserves and 6 percent of its asbestos reserves. Angola has large iron mines and exploits oil, a resource which is lacking in southern Africa as a whole, including South Africa. Mozambique has important underground reserves of tantalite (3) and beryl (4).

The mineral and oil production is geared for exporting. More than 90 percent of Zambia's exports, and 20 percent of Zambia's, are mineral-related. The mining sector holds a major place in the national economies--with the exception of Malawi. One-third of Zambia's national revenue is the result of its mineral exploitation.

If the wealth exists and constitutes an appreciable asset for general economic development, it must nevertheless be asked how it is managed. If the political authorities do not have complete control of them, it would be difficult for them to channel investment, and they could lose an appreciable part of the income needed for other development purposes. Angola and Mozambique have taken appropriate measures. But foreign interests, mostly South African, play a dominant role in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Even in Zambia the role of foreign companies, through shifts in technical assistance, cannot be ignored. Zimbabwe is studying ways to participate in the market of the South African and British companies which operate in its territory.

Leaving the mineral sector aside, manufacturing activity is limited in all the states--10 to 20 percent of the GNP. Zimbabwe, which has industrial installations, owned by foreign groups, should be above this figure; besides, its infrastructure continues to attract European industrials--the projects of M.A.N. and Volkswagen, for example. In any case, the industrial projects which are going to see the light of day in the next few years make necessary the establishment of a common policy to minimize regional imbalances.

Still, the agricultural sector remains vital for the economic equilibrium of some states and constitutes their main resource--80 percent of Tanzania's exports, 90 percent of Malawi's, are of agricultural origin. Angola, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique also export a large proportion of agricultural products. Production levels are very different, however, and the food reserves plan envisioned in Lusaka is shown to be necessary for a balance between resources and food needs at the regional level. In this perspective, some states could be brought to limit their export crops in order to contribute to this self-sufficiency.

Communications

Following this sectoral analysis, the conditions of regional economic integration can be examined. Except for Angola and Tanzania, all the other countries depend on South Africa for part of their supplies, sometimes for a preponderant part; this is the case in the small states belonging to this economic zone. By contrast, inter-state trade is almost nonexistent (5). However, international trade is very important for these countries; exports and especially imports represent 20 to 30 percent of their respective GNP's--in some cases even 40 percent. But the exports are raw materials and the imports relate to equipment, hydrocarbons, necessities (foods, textiles).

In this context, economic integration in the region is still to be done, the present economic structures apparently not complementing each other. It can only be done through sustained policies in agricultural and especially industrial matters. The project of creating a southern African development fund is a part of this. In present conditions, a re-directing of exports toward the interior of the economic zone is impossible; it is only conceivable if the raw materials undergo processing within this same zone; joint or coordinated industrial projects can be helpful. A policy of import substitution has its limits, for the investment needed will be higher, and the industrial technology could be difficult for the states in the region to control. In contrast, within the framework of economic development, the new needs could be provided for by regional production units.

For southern Africa and especially in light of the goal of economic integration, means of communication are of special interest. The communications and transport committee created in Lusaka is, in the present state of inter-state relations, the most highly operational organ in the near term. Up to now, the policies followed were basically directed toward the Rhodesian situation. South Africa and former Rhodesia practiced embargoes which, for example, strangled Zambia by depriving it of Mozambique's port outlets, which, at the same time, greatly diminished the activity in these same ports to the benefit of the South African port of Durban. Now all the landlocked states in the region--Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe--need to be linked to the great ports of Mozambique--Maputo, Beira, Nacula--of Tanzania--Dar Es Salaam--and of Angola--Benguela.

Zimbabwe's independence greatly increases the possibilities of the traffic, for it assures the landlocked states of outlets on the Indian Ocean. The Beira-Salisbury railroad, like the Beira-Umtali pipeline (6) strengthens the position of the port of Beira. This port, which serves the future economic zone of Cabora Bassa, is paradoxically benefitted by South Africa's construction of a line to permit Malawi to increase its outlets to the ocean. In total, the 9 states presently have a rail network of 15,000 km, which is small compared to South Africa's 20,000 km, the geographic space to cover being 4 times larger. A major effort thus remains to be accomplished in local relations; existing lines are oriented principally toward the exploitation of exportable resources, but they ignore vast regions of the interior.

Thus, in a regional context, joint investments and multi-state administration of infrastructures either new or already in place are perfectly conceivable and would answer to a real need of all the states. The military situation should not be forgotten; communication links are a top-ranking strategic objective for South Africa, and a communications policy should be completed by adequate national or regional protection.

The other aspect of infrastructure which is essential for economic independence concerns energy; a policy of coordination is envisaged in the Lusaka decisions. Regarding electric energy, the present situation, which is not however the fruit of concerted regional action--is the result of colonial projects, or responses to discriminatory colonial investments--is particularly propitious. Thanks mainly to the exploitation of water resources, every state is producing its own energy with surplus capacity. And, even though the financial agreements with investors sometimes give exploitation rights to South African interests, the hydrological projects often result in irrigation and industrialization projects.

If the situation is satisfactory in this area, it is not the same with hydrocarbons, and joint action could be effective. In effect, all the states, except for Angola, must import their hydrocarbon consumption from the producing countries on traditional commercial terms. Now Angola's oil resources could permit the development of imports to the interior of the zone, and on more advantageous financial conditions.

It appears thus that regional possibilities exist, but they will require a sustained effort to promote true economic integration. Serious action is indispensable; one can see the first signs of it in projects to establish an agricultural center for drouth research and to share training facilities at the regional level.

A Weapon Against Pretoria

In fact, all actions should tend toward loosening South Africa's grip on the most dependent states; the number of workers coming from Lesotho, Malawi, Botswana, and Swaziland--more than 450,000 in total--and now working in South Africa constitutes a not negligible curb on a joint policy. It must in any case be noted that regional concertation could enable this work force to be turned into a weapon against Pretoria; in effect, South Africa, which needs these workers, should no longer be able to recruit in the neighboring states by playing one country against another.

In a general sense, creation of an economic zone is in itself a plus for development. There is, however, a risk in the medium term, which is not negligible, namely infiltration into this economic zone of industrial or commercial interests--Western and South African--which could profit from the economic facilities to expand their own activities on a greater scale by utilizing the regional infrastructure.

That would result, then, in an economic development and even in an integration which would in fact be uncontrolled and which would be contrary to the interests of the states themselves and their peoples. The risk is not negligible when one considers that the various states, for diverse reasons, do not oversee their own national economies with the same degree of intensity.

FOOTNOTES

1. Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

2. The 9 countries account for about 15 percent of economic activity south of the Sahara in Africa.

3. Two-thirds of world reserves; tantalum ore is primarily used in special alloys.

4. Gems of the emerald family.

5. We are speaking here of actual commerce in goods, not of trade tied to the land-locked status of several states, the importance of which will be emphasized below.

6. The pipeline was closed during the blockade of Rhodesia.

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EDEM KODJO'S APPROACH CHALLENGED BY ISMAEL OULD AMAR

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 4 Jun 80 pp 50-51

[Ismael Ould Amar, engineer in arts and manufacturing and former director of the Mauritanian Industrial and Mining Company (SNIM), comments on Edem Kodjo's economic plan: "Reply to Edem Kodjo: for a Sectional Approach"]

[Text] In an interview conducted by Pr Mahdi Elmandjra (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1007), the secretary general of the OAU, Edem Kodjo, expressed his support for the idea of the need to promote the organization of vast economic spaces: he is pressing for the "development of the community mystique."

At Ground Level

The language is not new. He had already presided over the organization of regional and subregional communities which, when they did not disappear, did not contribute or barely contributed to the development in the interior of vast economic spaces which they proposed to create. On the other hand, they contributed to the creation of costly and useless administrative machinery and justified their existence by many meetings, verbose declarations and voluminous and indigestible reports.

What is the source of setback and disappointment? Not a bad theoretical conception but poor implementation. The communities are perceived as political organizations and their administrative machinery does everything it can to reinforce this perception. Established by governments without consultation with economic agents, they have remained the business of governments and their administrations and, like some of the latter, they hover above the economic spaces which they wish (fatal illusion) to organize and develop.

If Kodjo wants to seriously take up economic problems, he will have to invite the conferences he organizes and the community administrations which he gratifies with his esteem, to stop hovering and to come down to earth in their economic spaces to discover and deal with concrete problems with real action agents on the economic scene.

Let us come down to earth, therefore, and let us attempt to deal with the problems at ground level. Edem Kodjo is finding out that the economy is first of all the business of enterprises (in the broad sense) before it is that of governments and that any organization which does not place itself at the level of the concerns of enterprises will remain evanescent, without a grasp of reality. Kodjo notes that the enterprises should be made healthy; their general exploitation conditions stabilized; their access too scarce of or foreign resources (capital, human resources, supplies) organized and facilitated; their accountancy improved; their profitability increased. He is finding that every enterprise in general is associated with a well-identified economic sector and poses questions: can the enterprises in such and such sector prosper over the long-term in such and such national economic space? What opportunities are there for investment in this sector (expansion or creation of enterprises)? If the national sector produces partially or totally for export, what weight does it have on the international market, what influence does it have on the determination of prices? What new prospects are open to the enterprises of such and such sector by the expansion of the economic space?

Kodjo wishes to formulate replies. I am tempted to tell him: "Hold it, Mr Secretary General. Before answering, question the enterprises; assemble the qualified representatives of each sector; ask them to freely debate these questions and to formulate suggestions. Afterward, only afterward, prepare your proposals but allow them to be critiqued."

In my opinion, the sectional approach makes the most sense. It would be better that it precede the regional approach since it winds up there of necessity. Everything has happened as if African community logic was walking along with its head down. Let us put it back on its feet and make it walk on terra firma. Kodjo wants to take up the energy sector on a priority basis, dreaming of an African community which would be established on the basis of an agreement on energy. Cruel irony! He invites the Africans to depart from the beaten path to seek original plans for development, to forget "imported" methods "learned at the university." And, at the same time, he proposes the European way of establishing a common market.

Insecurity

Energy! That is the worst possible choice. There is no community of interest between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries which could lead to an agreement. Their interests are, on the contrary, different. I am delighted that the importing countries on the whole are getting half their energy supplies outside of Africa. Those which import oil from another African country are introducing into their supply system a particularly serious insecurity if the supplier is Algeria or Libya. These two countries have not yet acquired either the wisdom or the maturity necessary for the depoliticization of their commercial exchanges with the developing countries.

What common commercial or industrial enterprises can we envisage in the energy sector? An oil refinery in Guinea financed by the Libyan Jamahiriya to handle the oil from Hessi-Messaoud supplied by Algeria to cover Guinea's needs for refined products and those of countries on the coast of West Africa, from Senegal to the Ivory Coast?

...and Blackmail

Well, now! The refinery will have nothing from Hassi-Messaoud if the politburo of the party-state of Guinea refuses to recognize the Democratic Republic of the Sahara. It is also possible that it will never be completed if al-Qadhdhafi, unhappy over Guinea's recognition of a new government in Chad, cuts off its credits.

Let us be serious and avoid undertaking projects which carry within themselves the seed of their own destruction. Solidarity, which could result from the transfer of wealth from one African country to another African country, will remain an empty word; agreements reached and those which will be approved with fanfare, with a view to implementation of such solidarity, will flounder on the shoals of an immense disappointment.

As far as I am concerned, what is fundamental consists in identifying at the level of each sector (when this is possible), projects which will permit the creation of a solidarity for the defense of common interests of several countries or the resolution of problems posed in similar terms for several countries.

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NAIROBI CONFERENCE LAUNCHES COOPERATION OF EXPERTS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 4 Jun 80 pp 32-33

[Article by Habib Boulares]

[Text] In Nairobi, from 12 to 20 May 1980, Zimbabwe was honored during the conference of government experts on technical cooperation between African countries. Under the auspices of the UNDP (UN Development Program), this first large Pan-African meeting also saw the first appearance of experts from ex-Rhodesia. Of particular note: the Zimbabwean delegation, headed by a high official from the Ministry of Rural Development, Sydney T. Sekeramayi, included two whites among its six members.

Elevated to the position of first vice president (as the host country, Kenya assumed the presidency), Sekeramayi showed himself to be as patient as he was skilled. Zimbabwe is ready to adapt itself to long and difficult African conferences. The long fight conducted against Great Britain first and the Ian Smith regime next had taught the Zimbabwean cadres patience.

However, Nairobi was not the site of a special conference on Zimbabwe. Such a conference was held beginning 21 May in Salisbury where Michel Doo Kingue, UNDP director for Africa, headed a delegation of several organizations of the UN system which examined with the members of the Zimbabwean Government what international organizations could contribute as immediate assistance to the new independent state. At the request of the UNDP, the organizations of the UN system in fact had spent a year studying a certain number of projects and had prepared themselves for this eventuality. This was the first time such a procedure had been used. It should be stated that Zimbabwe represents a great symbol for Africa: it was necessary to demonstrate that a biracial or multiracial state in which the black majority governed could succeed or give the lie to the myth according to which only the whites in Southern Africa were the guarantors of prosperity.

In the meantime, the Nairobi conference on technical cooperation demonstrated something else: Africans have the means of intensifying technical cooperation among themselves; they must of necessity do so; and, to this end they must organize the methodology and procedures for such cooperation. This was the first time since September 1978 when the world conference on technical cooperation among developing countries met in Buenos Aires that a continental meeting on the same subject was held.

In this regard, Africa is doing pioneer work. Thus it was better prepared than other regions of the world at the big international conference on technical cooperation convened in Geneva from 26 May to 2 June to specifically examine progress made on the South-South plan since the Buenos Aires meeting.

Also convened by the UNDP, the Nairobi conference was to concentrate on three quite well defined areas: rural development, food production and the application of science and technology to development.

The central question raised was one of determining how the African states could intensify their technical cooperation in these three areas. At the initiative of Michel Doo Kingue, the UNDP charged Pr Mahdi Elmandjra with responsibility for coordinating the preparatory work of this conference. And the systematic study of experiments conducted in the field permitted the placing at the disposition of the conference substantial documents which prove at least one thing: technical cooperation between African countries does indeed exist in these three areas as in others; however, the interested states are not all fully informed. Information is poorly circulated. Certain experiments duplicate other experiments. Very many countries could benefit from interesting accomplishments which are unknown at the level of continents.

Some 197 experts representing 45 out of the 50 members of the OAU responded to the UNDP invitation. Two-thirds of them are true specialists on the questions debated: agronomic engineers, organizers and managers of rural development, directors of applied research laboratories, etc. Africa is discovering that it has real experts among its cadres. Supported by 55 representatives of African organizations, in the first rank of which are the OAU (Organization of African Unity) and the ECA (Economic Commission for Africa) and by 52 representatives from 20 international organizations, these experts demonstrated a remarkable concern for effectiveness. That ensured the richness of the debates and the significance of the proposals adopted.

Forty-five countries were represented in Nairobi; however, the various committees placed before the conference more than 96 drafts of practical recommendations. The committee which was responsible for putting them into a single document included 75 of these drafts. Therefore, Michel Doo Kingue who, before the conference, expressed his wish to come out of it with specific projects eligible for financing and capable of being carried out with the near future received a full measure.

The final text which is entitled "Recommendations from Nairobi for a Technical Cooperation Program Between African Countries" classifies the proposals on the basis of whether they deal with national institutions, the regional level, exchange of information, financing, priority sectors or international organizations. However, classified on the basis of type, these recommendations deal basically with the implementation of system for the mobilization of men, dissemination of information and the propagation of techniques.

In fact, if the Nairobi conference proved that technical cooperation exists between African countries and that it is not widely recognized, it also caused all the participants to discover two negative aspects: first, no country on the continent is really equipped to systematically benefit from Inter-African cooperation and second, this cooperation is not yet considered as a lever for national development.

Thence the insistence placed by the participants on the need for translating into fact the political will to cooperate which was expressed half-heartedly by many governments, as well as the recommendation made to the state to charge a ministry or permanent interministerial committee with the responsibility in each country for supervising cooperation activities.

The fact still remains that all this may only represent a mass of pious wishes. Also, perhaps it is necessary--above and beyond the data banks and other institutions suggested--to place more importance on the UNDP recommendation of making an annual report to the councils of ministers of the OAU and the ECA on progress made. Michel Doo Kingue formally committed himself to respect the agreements reached. He has the means of doing this: the UNDP is the supplier of funds to international governments and organizations. He promised to convene another conference on the question of the use of human resources. If all that is implemented--and we hope it will be--it will be said in a year that Nairobi marked the beginning of a new era of real cooperation between African countries.

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ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK AID TO AFRICA REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 May 80 p 1197

[Text] The Islamic Development Bank (IDB), whose main office is located in Djeddah, Saudi Arabia, has adopted for its fiscal year the calendar of the Hegira, according to which the year 1399 corresponds to the 1978-1979 period.

During the fiscal year, the authorized capital of 2 billion Islamic dinars (the Islamic dinar is equivalent to a special drawing right, SDR, on the International Monetary Fund and amounts to approximately 5.38 French francs) was freed by new subscriptions, which raised the actual capital to 780 million dinars. This capital is distributed among 36 member countries, the following which are in Africa: Algeria, Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Upper Volta, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Uganda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Chad and Tunisia.

During the year 1399 of the Hegira, the Islamic Development Bank granted 381.7 million dinars in financing, bringing the total amount of such financing since the year 1396 of the Hegira, when it was set up, to 759.5 million dinars.

As part of this financing, direct loans make up 119.3 million dinars and are distributed as follows: agriculture (7.9 percent); industry and mining (52.1 percent); transport and communications (25.2 percent; public services (8 percent), social services (4.2 percent and miscellaneous (2.6 percent).

In Africa, long-term loans from the Islamic Development Bank have gone to the following countries:

Mali: loan, repayable over 30 years, amounting to 6.3 million dinars, or $8 million, corresponding to some 10.2 percent of the total cost of the project for the construction of a 556-kilometer-long section of road between Sevare and Gao (co-financing by Arab funds).

Sudan: loan, repayable over 25 years, amounting to 5.5 million dinars, or $7 million, corresponding to approximately 30 percent of the total cost

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of the project for construction of a new airport in Port-Sudan (co-financed by the Saudi Development Fund).

Tunisia: loan, repayable in 25 years, amounting to 4.7 million dinars, or $6 million, representing some 6.2 percent of the overall cost of a water supply program in Sfax (co-financing from the World Bank and the Tunisian Government).

During the period under consideration, participation in capital by the Islamic Development Bank amounted to 44.8 million Islamic dinars ($57.7 million), including the following countries in Africa:

Mauritania: participation of 7.7 million dinars, or $10 million, in the capital of the National Industrial and Mining Company, amounting to $460 million, to get the low-grade iron ore operation at Guelbs into operation (also participating: World Bank, European Investment Bank, the Central Economic Cooperation Fund and Arab funds).

Tunisia: the subscribing of 4 million dinars, or $5.1 million, in the National Bank of Tunisia for capital investments in local enterprises.

The Islamic Development Bank also participated in various leasing operations during the 1978-1979 fiscal year, for a total of 39 million Islamic dinars, or $50 million, including the following countries in Africa:

Algeria: 7.8-million-dinar credit, amounting to $10 million (some 37 percent of the overall cost), in the National Livestock Feed Office for equipment.

Morocco: 3.5-million-dinar credit, or $4.5 million (nearly 75 percent of the overall cost), to the Eastern Cement Works, for the purchase of 85 railroad cars to haul bulk cement (to be supplied by a joint French-Moroccan firm).

Somalia: 5.6-million-dinar credit, or $7 million, corresponding to the total investment, to the Somalian Maritime Shipping Company for the purchase of two vessels (an oil tanker and a livestock freighter).

The Islamic Development Bank agreed to bear technical assistance expenditures for Niger (road program), Somalia (electrification project), Uganda (road studies) and Upper Volta (studies for an oil products storage dump), amounting to 1.7 million Islamic dinars, or $2.2 million.

Finally, using available funds without any immediate use, the Islamic Development Bank participated during the fiscal year under consideration in foreign trade financing operations for an overall sum of 445.7 million Islamic dinars, or $559.4 million, including the following nations in Africa:

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Algeria: 27.3 million dinars, or $35 million, for the importation of intermediate industrial products essential to industrial production, to be supplied by various European countries.

Guinea: 4.7 million dinars, or $6 million, for the importation of European cement.

Guinea-Bissau: 7.7 million dinars, or $10 million, for the importation of Algerian oil products.

Upper Volta: 2.5 million, or $3.3 million, for the importation of cement and steel from Europe.

Mali: 6.1 million dinars, or $8 million, for the importation of cement, sheet metal, bars for reinforced concrete, steel and fertilizer from various European countries.

Morocco: 23.2 million dinars, or $30 million, for the importation of oil products from Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Niger: 19.1 million dinars, or $24.4 million, for the importation of European cement and Libyan oil products.

Somalia: 19.6 million dinars, or $25.3 million, for the importation of Iraqi oil and cotton yarn from Arab countries.

Sudan: 45.1 million dinars, or $58.2 million, for the importation of oil products to be supplied by Kuwait and and jute fiber packing from Bangladesh.

Dr Ahmed Mohamed Ali heads the Islamic Development Bank. He is assisted by ten executive directors representing the following countries: Nigeria, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Guinea, Indonesia, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

QADHDHAFI WARNINGS--Qadhdhafi has warned the Francophone African nations who attended the Nice summit meeting: "Choose between the neocolonialist tutelage of France and Libyan economic aid." The first step to be taken against those countries that ignore his warning: the closing of their embassies in Tripoli. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 13 Jun 80 p 81] States whose policy seems to displease Qadhdhafi will have little chance of receiving ADB and BADEA aid. Qadhdhafi told African ambassadors in Tripoli that Libya controls 8.33 percent of ADB capital and 12.75 percent of BADEA's and that he would oppose granting any credits to such nations. [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Jun 80 p 46]

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY--Luanda Provincial Commissioner Mendes de Carvalho strongly criticized the activities of certain Angolan ministries. De Carvalho notably referred to the problems affecting Luanda as a result of the poor distribution of potable water and electricity, stating that the cause lies with "the inefficient operation of certain ministries, among them the Ministry of Energy, and the ministries of Housing and Construction and of Domestic Trade." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Jun 80 p 1520]

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SOME AGITATION SAID TO EXIST

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1045

[Text] For the past few weeks, some social agitation has been noticed in Bangui, an agitation characterized by tension concerning the sectors of employment and education.

As early as 5 April, labor leaders from the UGTC (General Union of Central African Workers), the only trade union, denounced the discontinuance of jobs in the private sector. Two thousand employees have reportedly lost their jobs since the return from summer vacation last September in the republic. Ten enterprises have closed and others have reduced their manpower and their working hours. The reappearance, at the beginning of April, of the shortage of petroleum supplies increased the importance of technical unemployment. In mid-April the Mocaf brewery had to interrupt its production for this reason. The road system's repair works also suffered the consequences of the shortage.

In the public sector, the wages, owing to French aid, are regularly paid in Bangui but not in the provinces. The Central African financial recovery plan, approved by France, provides for, it is known, a curbing of manpower in public office (MTM of 28 March 1980, p 755). This has actually taken place in the police force and in the army, but the number of civil servants will probably have the tendency to increase, in particular with the reinstatement of the civil servants unfairly dismissed by Bokassa.

The suppression of ACESNA (Central African Agency for Air Navigation Safety) by the government, which demanded the CAR's return to ASECNA (Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar) was followed by difficulties with that agency's personnel ever since last December. The general manager and the assistant general manager having been dismissed in March, the personnel demanded their reinstatement as well as the dismissal of the ACESNA French agents. In addition, the program concerning the reorganization of state enterprises is continuing. In Bangui it is feared that the actual taking of control by the French company Saga of Socatraf (Central African river transportation company) will involve the dismissal of about 400 employees from ACCF (Central African agency for river communications).

Central African students also express their dissatisfaction with the government. A strike took place when Easter vacation ended, for a benign reason, but one which reveals the tension resulting from the desire to emphasize the choice. On 9 and 10 April, Bangui university and high school students organized a demonstration of support for Malian students. Slogans hostile to Vice-President Maidou were shouted during the demonstrations.

Thus, the intentions, expressed by the government, of straightening out the country's economic situation by partly changing the public sector into the private sector and by taking economy measures (reduction in the number of civil servants and in the number of students) tend to foster social tension, whereas the consequences of this new policy will not be felt before next year.

A latent hostility to expatriate, especially French, personnel, technical assistants and teachers is a constant of the bad-tempered movements noted here and there, when France brings marked support to Central African attempts at recovery.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

BOUAR BASE TO BE REACTIVATED--France and the Central African Republic have drafted a plan calling for a new upsurge in livestock breeding, the production of crops and all products capable of helping the Central African Republic to achieve self-sufficiency in food, French Minister of Cooperation Robert Galley announced following his visit to the Central African Republic from 16 to 20 May. The minister also agreed to reorganization of the Bouar military training center (400 kilometers to the northwest of Bangui), responding thus to the request for aid addressed to France by President Dacko. "The reactivation of this base remains a key factor in the apparatus for the training and re-training of Central African forces," Mr Galley said, adding that this operation will also have the result of promoting a new economic takeoff in this zone, particularly in the farm sector. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1272] 5157

MINIMUM WAGES INCREASED--A presidential decree dated 6 May 1980, and effective 1 May 1980, increased the Interoccupational Guaranteed Minimum Wage and the Agricultural Guaranteed Minimum Wage to 13,000 CFA francs. We reported in our 2 May 1980 issue, on page 1045, on the social tension seen in Bangui, partially connected with the desire of the Central African authorities for economic recovery, a desire which, in the public view, could have unfortunate effects on employment. The decision to increase minimum wages demonstrates the desire of the public authorities to avoid the spread of the idea that economic recovery will be effected at the expense of the poorest portion of the population. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1272] 5157

MINISTER VISITS GREECE--Economic cooperation between Greece and the Central African Republic, as well as Greek participation in the meeting of financial backers in Bangui next June, were the focus of the talks held on 21 and 22 May between Central African Minister of State for Transports Thimothee Malendoma with Greek leaders, in particular Messrs Konstantinos Mitsotakis and Stavros Dimas, ministers of foreign affairs and commerce, respectively. Prime Minister Georgios Rallis, in the course of his first speech before the Parliament on 21 May, had stressed the importance Greece assigns to its relations with the Third World countries.

Referring in particular to the African nations, he termed them "fertile ground" justifying the hope of "broader" cooperation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1272

DEPARTMENTS ABOLISHED--By presidential decree, the following general state supervisory departments were eliminated as of 15 April: General Finance Inspectorate, General Posts and Telecommunications Inspectorate, the General Customs Authority, and the General Inspectorate for Embassies. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1272] 5157

STATE INSPECTORATE GENERAL--By an ordinance issued 11 April 1980, a state inspectorate general was created in the CAR. This regulatory body is placed under the direct authority of the president of the republic and can be placed at the disposition of the prime minister for his use. The old regulatory bodies were concurrently dissolved: state general authority, inspectorate general for finances, inspectorate general for postal services, general authority for customs, inspectorate general for embassies. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1045] 9181

FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT DONATION--The French ambassador to Bangui, Mr Robert Picquet, delivered to the Central African government on 15 April a consignment of military material including 9 jeeps and 17 light trucks, intended for the CAR army's strike regiment. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1045] 9181

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CONGO

PETROLEUM PROSPECTS RESULTING FROM NEW DISCOVERY REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1047

[Text] We announced briefly in our issue of 25 April 1980, p 988, that President Sassou Nguesso had opened the "Likouala Marine" oil field on 21 April.

This oil field was discovered and put into production by ELF Congo, holder of the Pointe-Noir ocean deeps" license, in which the Agip group has a 35 percent participation.

Production from the Likouala oil field should reach about 1.5 million tons in a full year. This production fits into the framework of an increase in the Congo's oil production which calls for, during the next 2 years, the development and placement into production by ELF Congo of the Yanga-Sendji oil field.

On 21 April the Congolese chief of state received in a private audience the ELF Aquitaine group president, with whom he discussed the developments in progress. Col Sassou Nguesso and Mr Albin Chalandon, in this connection, noted with interest the confirmation, through the drilling of "Mengo 102", performed on the land license of Loeme by ELF Congo in association with the national company, Hydrocongo, of production possibilities already indicated by the drilling of "Mengo 101". Moreover, they spoke about the possibilities of industrial cooperation between the ELF Aquitaine group and the Congo People's Republic.

Let us recall that the "Pointe indienne" oil field is today in decline and that "Emeraude's" production was disappointing in spite of the size of the reserves because the very heavy crude is exploitable with difficulty.

Congolese oil production was 2.7 million tons of crude in 1979. It should be able to reach, taking into account the new discoveries, 5 million tons between now and 1982 and should be able to pass 8 million tons before the end of this decade.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

FRENCH FINANCING AGREEMENT--France and the Congo have just signed three financing agreements in Brazzaville involving a total amount of 2.17 billion CFA francs. The first, in the amount of 75 million CFA francs, pertains to the Mantsoumba state farm complex for the improvement of cassava cultivation. The second, involving 600 million CFA francs, pertains to the portion to be added to the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) contribution for the proposed route corrections on the Congo-Ocean Railroad (CFCO). Finally, the third, in the amount of 1.5 billion CFA francs, also pertains to the route work on the CFCO and the reorganization of the Trans-Congolese Communications Agency (ATC). On 22 May, 2 other cooperation agreements involving a total of 198 million CFA francs were signed between France and the Congo in Brazzaville. The first, in the amount of 73 million CFA francs, pertains to the subsidy for sectorial aid to Marien N'Gouabi University, while the second, involving 125 million CFA francs, pertains to the operation of the urban development unit, the completion of cartographic projects and the studies relative to the master plans for the cities of Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1273] 5157

CENTRAL COMMITTEE WORK COMMISSIONS--In mid-April a presidential act was published in Brazzaville creating work commissions within the central committee of the Congolese Labor Party. These commissions, numbering five, are connected to the political bureau. The commissions are: education, planning and economy, organization, foreign relations, propaganda. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1047] 9181

INCREASE IN MONEY SUPPLY--The Congo's national monetary committee, which met on 14 April in Brazzaville under the chairmanship of the minister of finance, Mr H. Lopes, examined the banking situation in the Congo. At the end of February 1980, it showed an improvement in foreign liquid assets at sight and an appreciable increase in fiduciary currency. The monetary situation at the end of December 1979 reveals that the year 1979 was marked by a large increase in the money in circulation owing to an improvement in the country's net foreign credits and to the development of domestic credit. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1047] 9181

CSO: 4400

FRENCH AID TO DJIBOUTI DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1277

[Text] On the occasion of a visit paid by President Hassan Gouled to France, let us recall that the Republic of Djibouti signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation, as well as agreements in the economic, financial and state ownership fields, with the French Republic on 27 June 1977. At the beginning of 1978, other agreements or conventions were signed pertaining to the provision of personnel for technical aid, culture and education, training, maritime affairs and civil aviation. An agreement on scientific and technical research is being drafted.

A protocol signed at the time independence was achieved calls for the stationing of French military forces in Djibouti.

Technical aid to the Republic of Djibouti in personnel is in great measure a substitution project, for independence has just recently been won, and the country still lacks trained cadres who can guarantee the proper functioning of its administration. The training of cadres and the training of teachers is thus a priority in French aid. The total number of French cooperative workers in Djibouti is 482, including 302 in education and training, 44 in health and social welfare, 46 in administrative and court cooperation, 33 in equipment and communications, 13 in industrial development, 24 in civil aviation, etc.

In 1979, French government aid to Djibouti came to 275 million French francs. Since in 1977, the year Djibouti achieved its independence, French aid had been 16 million, and the total for 1978 was 259 million francs, the total aid provided by France since independence comes to 550 million francs.

During 1979, the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) allocated subsidies totaling 11 million francs to the Republic of Djibouti. The main achievement financed by the FAC since independence was achieved include the building of a ground station for satellite telecommunications, the building and equipping of a normal school for teachers, the extension of the CES in Boulaos, the establishment of a pilot truck gardening farm (Attar), campaigns to combat tuberculosis and the equipping of hospital centers.

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DJIBOUTI

BRIEFS

AID FROM IRAQ--A communique released on 27 May stated that Iraq has granted Djibouti aid in the amount of almost $60 million, $26 million in loans and the rest as a gift. This communique, published at the conclusion of the Council of Ministers meeting, stressed the importance to Djibouti's economic development of the aid granted by Iraq at the conclusion of the visit paid to Baghdad last week by the prime minister of Djibouti, Mr Barkat Gourad. It was noted that within the framework of this aid, Iraq will participate in the financing of a cement plant project and will entirely finance the building of a 150-housing-unit complex. In addition, it is giving a laboratory to the Higher Institute for Scientific and Technical Research in Djibouti, and a Boeing aircraft to Air Djibouti, while President Saddam Hussein of Iraq has made a personal gift of a plane to President Hassan Gouled. Iraq has also made a gift of $1.4 million to aid the victims of the drought, and technicians in the fodder sector and agricultural experts from Iraq are expected in Djibouti. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1277] 5157

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ETHIOPIA

BRIEFS

TROOP MOVEMENTS--There is a thump of marching feet in the Horn of Africa: two Ethiopian divisions commanded by Soviet and Cuban cadres have been transferred from Eritrea to the Ogaden on the northern border of Somalia. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 27 Jun 80 p 79]

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GHANA

BRIEFS

TRADE WITH BRITAIN--Trade between Great Britain and Ghana during the first 3 months this year totaled Pounds 56 million. Great Britain's purchases amounted to 24.4 million pounds and its sales to 31.6 million pounds. Ghana's trade deficit thus amounted to 7.2 million pounds. Britain's purchases consisted mainly of cocoa, coffee, tea and spices with the emphasis on cocoa. Purchases for these four products amounted to 19.2 million pounds. None of the other products reached 1 million pounds. As for Ghanaian purchases, they consisted principally of automobiles, (8.6 million pounds), specialized machinery (2.5 million pounds), industrial machinery (2.5 million pounds) and electrical equipment (1.2 million pounds). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Jun 80 p 1506]

FAD AGRICULTURAL LOAN--The International Fund for Agricultural Development (FAD) granted Ghana a $12.5 million loan on 3 June to develop agricultural production in the Volta valley. The program will benefit some 50,000 families, or approximately 360,000 persons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Jun 80 p 1506]

TRANSPORT SERVICES OFFERED--The Redcoat Cargo Airlines company has offered Ghana its truck transport services that will allow direct shipment of certain merchandise not exceeding 5 tons from the Accra airport to other large cities such as Tamale, Takoradi and Kumasi. The company has already offered such services to many other countries in francophone West Africa. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Jun 80 p 1506]

WOOD SECTOR POLISH COOPERATION--The Ghana Timber Marketing Board (GTMB) is considering the construction of a 2 million-cedi plant for the manufacture of spare parts for the wood industry. This factory, which would become operational within 2 years, would be a joint venture between the GTMB and a Polish firm. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Jun 80 p 1506]

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LIBERI/

NEW REGIME FACING MANY FUTURE DANGERS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 May 80 pp 40, 41

[Article by Raphaël Mergui: "The Proletarians of Politics--The Coup Against Tolbert Was Even More Craftsmanlike Than Was First Believed"]

[Text] On the evening of 11 April the small diplomatic community of Monrovia was celebrating the departure of the Guineas ambassador. Most of the ministers of the Tolbert government were among the guests. But their heart was not in it. Everyone's mind was obsessed by a certain date, 14 April, first anniversary of the riots of the year before.

For the past several weeks the atmosphere had been tense in Monrovia. Both government and opposition, each after its own fashion, were resolved to celebrate the rice riots. A coup was clearly expected. But rather more one coming from Joseph Chesson, the cruel minister of justice, said to be disappointed by the "softness" of William Tolbert. When soldiers came to let him out of his cell, Bacchus Matthews (leader of the PPP, Peoples Progressive Party) was seized with fright and refused to leave, thinking it was Chesson who had brought off a putsch. The other candidate for government office is Maj William Jerbo. Brilliant officer and prestigious football player, he was chief of the Liberian elite troop units and very popular. In hiding since the 12 April coup, he was cut down on 8 May while attempting to cross the Mano River to find asylum in Sierra Leone.

Ring and Fire

On that night of 11-12 April at 1:00 am William Tolbert was back from a Baptist conference. This pious man made an unaccustomed decision to spend the night in his pretentious presidential palace, the Executive Mansion, rather than his out-of-town private residence at Benton some 50 km from Monrovia.

Not far from the mansion, at that very moment, 15 soldiers held a secret meeting on the beach. The senior in grade was a certain Master Sgt Samuel Doe. The others were buck sergeants, corporals or privates. The group split up. Doe and nine of his comrades remained on the beach. The other five, led by Sgt Thomas Quiwonkpa, made off in the direction of the presidential palace. They carried no weapons. In the most ordinary way, they rang the palace front doorbell. Two accomplices let them in and served them with weapons. The fighting was done quickly. Tolbert was assassinated in his bed, and 27 of his bodyguards were killed. By then it was 2:00 am.

That date, 12 April, had been chosen with care. On Sunday the 14th Tolbert was to have taken a plane for Zimbabwe to join in celebrating that country's independence. The 15 conspirators and their two accomplices immediately spread out to the two barracks areas of Monrovia, Barclay Training Center and Camp Schiefflin, to pass the good word on to the soldiers: Tolbert is dead. The barracks had an unbelievable outburst of jubilation. The officers, frightened, kept under cover in their quarters. The diplomats home from the Guinean Embassy reception had barely put on their pyjamas when bursts of submachine-gun fire rattled through town. The end of Tolbert. Soldiers fired into the air to wake the population and invite them to join in the celebration. On the morning of 12 April bands of leaderless soldiers roamed through town. Paid $80 a month, they were not used to satisfying their hunger for food. The loot they demanded was more due to a beggar-mentality under military constraints than a hold-up. They had the doors opened up for them at all the stylish villas of Monrovia to empty the refrigerators. From terrified drivers of automobiles they extorted a few miserable dollars. They were unable to count in the hundreds of dollars, only the singles. Their main victims were the foreigners, and not, curiously enough, the Afro-Americans. The only serious infractions were the rape of two white women. Master Sergeant Doe took vigorous action. He had three soldiers and one civilian accused of pillaging executed, and order was reestablished.

Sans-culottes

To be sure the tranquility is precarious. ID checks are still performed rudely at times. The only thing any soldier tried to extort from me at gunpoint was..."my philosophy of life." There are still a few who fire their weapons in the air for purposes of intimidation. The threat of not drawing their pay will surely compel them to return to the ranks.

Master Sgt Doe's "revolution" was accomplished by a miracle. Seventeen conspirators organized into a "peoples' redemption committee" without any troops and without any political party took over the government as francs-tireurs. In a few days these sans-culotte ragtag and bobtail revolutionaries, destitute of property, humiliated and allegedly illiterate got the country back and running again.

Who is their chief, Sergeant Samuel Doe? Born in 1952, he finished primary school in 1967 and 2 years later joined the Army. His superiors considered him intelligent enough to send him to the Army Signals School, from which he graduated in 1971. Promoted First Sergeant in 1973, he was given command of a unit of 150 men. Sergeant Doe, however, had a dream of getting himself a secondary school completion certificate. He gave his evenings over to study and spent time particularly at the Marcus Garvey School, whose co-principal was a certain...Dr Tipoteh, leader of MOJA [Movement for Justice in Africa], then part of the Opposition. No personal relationship of any kind developed between the two men. But the school did inculcate pan-Africanism into its students. Samuel Doe was on the point of finishing his second year and obtaining his yearned-for diploma when at the beginning of 1979 he was transferred out into the provinces, to finish off his military training. There is no reason not to suppose that he retained a political awareness of some sort or other from his night school courses, particularly a massive contempt for corruption. Doe has no political preference. He says he is not socialist, but does not identify himself as a capitalist either... As a faithful Baptist he believes in a vague morality of equal opportunity for all. Promoted Master Sergeant [sergent-chef] on 11 October 1979, he was given command of the 3d Batallion stationed at Monrovia. Like nearly all his 16 co-conspirators, Samuel Doe is of the Khranh tribe. This may be a factor contributing to unity, but it is a bad augury for the future. A power monopoly in the government exercised by members of one ethnic group risks the provocation of discontent in a country that had so far escaped the evils of tribalism.

Bad Omen

That is not the only danger to which Master Sergeant Doe's regime is exposed. The former high-ranking officers appointed to ministerial posts and the civilians of the Cabinet might well ally themselves--with American help?--against the new political "rabble" who are the membership of the CPR [Committee of Popular Redemption]. As recently as Wednesday, 14 May it was learned that the new minister of commerce, Major Douglas, and some other officers of the old regime like himself, had been arrested for attemtping a counter-coup. And that is only the beginning.

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CSO: 4400

MALI

MINISTER OF INFORMATION DENOUNCES 'JEUNE AFRIQUE' ARTICLE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1015, 18 Jun 80 pp 16-17

[Text] Some Malians had been under the impression that the editor-in-chief of JEUNE AFRIQUE--who is supposedly familiar with Mali and Malians--had understood the soul of our people and its aspirations. But Sennen Andriamirado has understood nothing of our country because he only perceived the surface of things.

We shall certainly not engage in a polemic with JEUNE AFRIQUE and Mr Andriamirado. We understand very well the imperatives of ciruclation and sales, and are familiar, moreover, with the fact that any article on Mali increases the circulation of JEUNE AFRIQUE. However, we had thought (wrongly, no doubt) that the ethics of news reporting entailed the obligation of objectivity and veracity.

We have never wished to confuse congeniality with guilty complacence, but likewise, never shall we tolerate--in the name of seeming friendship--that our realities be purposely misrepresented and that the moral and spiritual values which form our people's raison d'etre and pride be tarnished.

We are for impartial information and for an objective analysis of a concrete situation, but when a reporter does everything in his power to attribute to given persons disloyal intentions of baseless opinions, in a naked attempt at formenting actions and behavior contrary to the interests of an entire people, we believe that there is a deliberate intent to undermine and hurt. The last article of JEUNE AFRIQUE sbout Mali gives a clear indication of the goal that is being pursued: sow the seeds of discord and trouble, plant the tree of doubt and demoralization on the basis of fabricated words. For those familiar with the Malian soul, it would be an aberration to think that a single Malian could believe for a moment that even one inch of our sovereignty can be ceded for material gains.

Another obvious indication of the author's ignorance of the Malian spirit is the fact he attributes certain statements to Gen Moussa Traore. In Mali, we are not in the habit of making our positions known through third parties;

we do it ourselves, through those voices that carry the highest authority, and at the most appropriate places. Nevertheless, we have insisted on preserving the best relations with our neighbors and our partners on the continent and elsewhere in a spirit of mutual respect. More specifically, the historical ties uniting Mali and France have allowed a varied and fruitful cooperation, based on the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as on non-interference in domestic affairs.

It should perhaps be recalled that Mali has always been an intransigent defender of nonalinement. Actually, it is in accordance with this principle that our country is cooperating with all the nations of the world, no matter what their political options may be.

Thus, it is easy to understand Mr Andriamirado's motivation in choosing the eve of the Franco-African conference for his attempt to inject an element of doubt into the cooperation between Mali and France. However, neither the French nor the Malians will be deceived.

Finally, Malians are amused by the outlandish statements circulated by certain newspapers about an eventual coup d'etat, whose scenario is planned within their own minds: this is why Malians laugh at those diversionary attempts at dividing and categorizing our country's leaders.

Should we also note that Mali is living within a political system conceived and established by Malians; that Mali is living within a normal constitutional regime and that Malians have never thought as military one one side and civilians on the other, but only as citizens of the country? Finally, should it be mentioned again that we have functioning democratic institutions which regulate our nation's existence?

Indeed, Mr Andriamirado's memory must be refreshed.

Ahmed Mohamed Ag Hamany, Minister of Information and Communication, Bamako, Mali

Reply: We are not sure we have understood that which Mr Hamany wishes to deny, and must less the "counter-truths" he wants to contest: there are no facts to provide a foundation for this long indictment. However, as an exception and in a show of courtesy toward Mail, we chose to publish this text which resembles a political tract.

CSO: 4400

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

LOCAL RAILROAD CAR PRODUCTION--The Mozambican COMETAL-MOMETAL Company is now studying an important project pertaining to the establishment of a factory for the manufacture of railroad passenger cars aimed at ending onerous imports. Technology would be provided by a Portuguese company specializing in the manufacture of stainless steel cars, an excellent solution given the climate of the country. In a first phase, the factory could produce 100 units yearly, a savings to Mozambique of at least 600,000 contos. It could then undertake the manufacture of railroad cars for export. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Jun 80 p 1521]

CSO: 4400

NIGER

GOVERNMENT PRUDENT IN SPENDING URANIUM INCOME

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 May 80 pp 56, 57

[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "Watch Out for the High Profile--Thanks to Uranium, One Lives Better in Niamey. But One Keeps a Cool Head"]

[Text] Twenty cars in front. Five behind, and 15 stopped in the other direction. The taxi driver is having a fit. "It's Lagos!" Lagos perhaps, but 50 years ago...Because right now Niamey really has nothing about it of a town on the verge of asphyxiation. No one gets bumped into, either on the sidewalk or the road-sholders piled with powdery laterite dust, and when seen by a foreigner, the capital of Niger looks like a big village in a doze. But someone from Niamey finds this town has very much of a new look! The Foreign Ministry is covered with scaffolding, the El Nasr building dominates the capital with its dozen floors, the Hotel Tenéré is brand spanking new and the commercial buildings where people have been getting rich from Niger for three-quarters of a century have had to replace their aging premises with modern construction. A gentle breeze of renovation is blowing through the town since uranium dollars have been tumbling massively into the State's coffers: uranium extraction brought in 21 billion CFA francs in 1979 (37 percent of the national budget).

The Reverse of the Coin

Everyone is of course delighted, taking care at the same time not to be conspicuous about it. Tell a Niger citizen that his country is rich and he will assume a modest expression and answer: "But no, Niger is still poor." But tell him his country is poor and he will answer, much stung: "Not at all, Niger has immense assets." The biggest one at the moment is uranium, the fallout from which has not been long in making its appearance.

According to the general opinion, "one eats better." In five years the minimum wage has gone up from 5,200 CFA francs to 17,180 CFA francs (+330 percent). Housing has been built for civil servants, dams and major projects to open up communication with the outside (highways, railways) are in the stage of active realization.

Psychosis of the Rich

There is, however, the reverse of the coin. Another sector has experienced increases of 350 percent and more: real estate. Companies setting up business in Niamey, whether or not directly connected with the uranium boom, have created a very strong demand for villas on the part of the expatriate personnel. Solicited from every direction, the owners rent to whoever makes the best offer. And they are familiar with the art and manner of imposing on people: "I was renting a four-room villa for 150,000 CFA francs," we were told by an engineer. "One day the landlord came to tell me he was demanding 250,000 francs starting next month. This is current practice." Niamey, which grew rapidly, has a real housing shortage.

And there is no way to escape victimization by whims of the "sharks." Business is business. The word has gotten around. New rich, pretended rich, shady deals, corruption, favoritism, nepotism, if one is to believe President Seyni Kountché, constitute the seven plagues of the country. Does that mean one is likely to encounter almost anywhere Niger sheiks with pickets stuffed with uranium dollars? Curiously enough, they are nowhere to be seen. Could it be for reasons of discretion? In actual fact the fallout from uranium has not (yet?) brought into existence that parasite class which all the way from Kinshasa to Abidjan by way of Libreville characterizes the newly rich countries. The virulent denunciations coming from Seyni Kountché, when closely scrutinized, are more for prevention than cure. And vigilance is so strong that those with a few millions too many--often acquired in President Diori Hamani's time--take good care not to show it.

It is out of the question for a big businessman--still less for a minister of the government--to drive around in a BMW or have himself a villa built of marble. The authorities, beginning with the Head of State, will not be long in asking for explanations. For all the good things that may be said of it, this intent of preventing the formation of a new bourgeoisie heaping upon itself the wealth of the country has a disadvantage: it dampens the enthusiasm of potential investors... To the extent that this psychosis of the newly rich has going along with it a psychosis about foreigners. One is quick to denounce expatriate wheeler-dealers, the gangs of internationalism, corruption and extortion... It is quite true that the massive influx of foreigners attracted by the mining production (2,000 tons of uranium concentrate in 1978 out of a world total of 34,000 tons) in this country which foremerly was fought shy of by everyone because of its poverty and aridity, understandably gives to some a cause for irritation.

Though the Europeans keep a low profile at Niamey, things are very different at Arlit, the mining town. The companies working the uranium deposits practice the most absolute sort of discrimination in matters of hiring, wages, promotion, vacation and housing. For the advantage of the expatriate personnel. Threats hang over the possible trade-unionists, there are bars reserved for whites only... Material for creating very exacerbated tensions. And even though the government has asked of the Nigeriens not to give free rein to xenophobia, it is known to be quite prepared not to tolerate that Niger citizens' dignity be trampled underfoot. In April the Minister of Mines, Mounkaïla Harouna during a visit to Arlit made a point of discussing these thorny problems with delegates representing the Nigerien and expatriate personnel.

No to Adventurers

As for the other Africans--namely Senegalese workers and craftsmen and Malian businessmen--up to now they have had no reason to complain. No one has found fault with them, as frequently happen elsewhere, for coming to "eat the cake of the Niger people."

Latest comer in the circles of countries doing an economic takeoff thanks to their energy resources, Niger has learned to draw lessons from the failures of those that before it were dubbed the Eldorados of Africa. That is why adventurers, foreign or domestic, are politely but firmly requested to make a renunciation of their appetites.

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CSO: 4400

DOUBTS PERSIST ABOUT FUTURE AFTER RESHUFFLE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Jun 80 p 1509

[Text] Recently re-elected president of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principle Pinto da Costa reshuffled his government at the beginning of June.

It should be noted that three ministers have departed: Alda do Espiritu Santo, who headed the Ministry of Information and Culture and was known for her orthodox Marxist positions as well as for her poetic talent, becomes president of the National Assembly; Evaristo Carvalho and Leonel de Alva, ministers of public works and education respectively, are leaving the government. Commandant Daniel Daio, minister of defense and security--sometimes considered the strongman of the regime--keeps his post. However, it seems that his influence will now be counter-balanced by that of the new minister of housing, Lt Aguiar Sousa, former chief of security who, together with Commandant Raoul Braganca, was in opposition to Commandant Daio on the way to treat former Prime Minister Miguel Trovoada, arrested in October 1979 and still detained without trial.

The Trovoada affair still constitutes an embarrassment for the Sao Tome Government. Amnesty Interational reportedly announced the imminent arrival of an investigation mission and the UN is again stressing the unacceptable nature of the former prime minister's arrest in the PNUD offices which enjoyed the status of extraterritoriality.

The Portuguese socialist party has reportedly also decided to send as an observer one of its officials, Mr Almeida Santos--a lawyer who negotiated Sao Tome's independence in former years--in the event of a public trial.

No matter what the solution to be adopted by Pinto da Costa to settle this delicate issue, it will surely not dispel certain basic problems of local political life which indicate that Sao Tome's situation remains very uncertain following the formation of the new government.

The Government of Sao Tome (5 June 1980)

President of the Republic, chief of government	Manuel Pinto da Costa
Ministers:	
Defense and Security	Commandant Daniel Daio
Information	Maria do Rosario Barros
Agriculture	Arlindo Gomes
Health	Dr Carlos Tini
Foreign Affairs, Education and Culture	Mariado Amorim
Justice	Celestino Costa
Planning	Henrique da Costa
Construction, Housing, Transports and Communications	Lt Oscar Aguiar Sousa
State Secretaries:	
Education	Rafael Branco
Construction	Fernando Paquete

CSO: 4400

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SENEGAL

ECONOMIC CRISIS BENEFITS PDS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 May 80 pp 42, 43

[Article: "Who Profits from the Crisis?"]

[Text] Complete with much demonstration of oratory and folk-lore, the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] held its Third Congress on 16, 17 and 18 May at Dakar. Sixteen hundred delegates represented the 32 federations of the party. Also observed was the presence of delegations from MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front], the ANC [African National Congress] of South Africa, Maître Demba Diallo, representing the Malian democrats and "comrades" from the PAI [African Independence Party], a Senegalese Marxist-Leninist party legally in the opposition.

In a super-heated atmosphere the Congress unanimously renewed the appointment of the Secretary General, Maître Abdoulaye Wade and the Deputy Secretary General Fara Ndiaye. The National Secretariat increased from 12 to 25 members, two of them women. Except for these new structures, nothing especially new was said at this Third Congress which styled itself one of orientation. In regard to domestic policy, the PDS, following a statement on the inability of the Socialist Party in power to bring about recovery in the economic situation, called for the dissolution of the National Assembly and the holding of free elections, following which the parties coming out ahead could make up a common front of government. In foreign policy, the party reaffirmed its support for the liberation movements: The PLO, Polisario--whose delegation was not permitted to enter Senegal--ANC and SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] of Namibia. Support also for friendly parties: the FLN [Algerian National Liberation Front], FRELIMO and MPLA. In this connection the Congress demanded "immediate normalization of Senegal's relations with the Angolan State."

With 650,000 members, the PDS has over the last 6 months become a true mass party. It is the serious economic crisis now prevailing in Senegal, however, that has rallied a number of malcontents to its banner for some time. At the time of the Congress the Secretary General of the Socialist Party section of the Bakel District [of Dakar?] switched over to the PDS, taking along with him (as he says) the 20,000 socialist party militants of the area.

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CSO: 4400

SENEGAL

TERMS OF SWISS CREDIT REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1036

[Text] Switzerland granted Senegal a credit for a total amount of three billion francs CFA on 21 April. It consists of two credits of 12 million Swiss francs each, one granted by the Swiss Federal Council for commercial agreements and the other by a consortium of Swiss banks. The official documents were signed on the Senegalese side by Mr Louis Alexandrenne, minister of planning and cooperation and on the Swiss side by Ambassador Klaus Jacobi, delegate from the Swiss Federal Council for commercial agreements, and Roland Frey, representative from the consortium of Swiss banks.

The first credit is repayable in 20 years including ten years with deferred payments and without interest and the second in seven and a half years including two years with deferred payments.

The ambassador from the Swiss Confederation, Mr Klaus Jacobi, indicated that the signed agreements are going to contribute to making these relations even more intense "not only from the point of view of exchanges but also of investments."

The two credits are intended to cover the purchase of goods and the performance of swiss services. They relate to the realization of social and economic development projects like grain storage infrastructures, hydrogeologic research and installations for the port of Djifer, the rehabilitation of the seed-bearing farm of Savoigne, an increase in rice storage units, the medical equipment program, the Ministry of Information's equipment program and telecommunications equipment.

Finally, there are also plans for the financing of the equipment and material for the development of the Anambe valley, the Kaolack and Louga slaughter-houses, the development of the eucalyptus plantation in the river, the research for the project to control bush fires and lastly the supervision and monitoring of the Kaolack diesel power station project.

9181
CSO: 4400

SENEGAL

FLEUVE REGION RICE PRODUCTION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1036

[Text] The company for the development and exploitation of the delta region (SAED) hopes, despite difficult climatic conditions, to complete the 1979-1980 campaign in the Fleuve region with a rice production of 15,000 tons, that is to say 10,000 tons of hulled rice. The 1977-1978 marketing produced about 5,416 tons, as opposed to 12,380 tons in 1978-1979. By 17 April 1980, 8,327 tons had already been marketed for the 1979-1980 campaign.

The hydro-agricultural developments are likewise advancing. Thus, the surface areas realized followed an ascending course: 1977-1978 period: 8,820 hectares; 1978-1979: 10,310 hectares; 1979-1980: 13,147 hectares; in 1980-1981, 15,381 hectares will be realized. But, out of the 8,559 hectares sowed in rice, only 7,558 hectares were productive in 1979-1980.

At its creation in 1965, SAED had for its main objective the development, in ten years, of 30,000 hectares cultivated in rice. But, the adversity of the climatic conditions, amplified by the constraints of developing and exploiting diked and hastily developed land, led to the Senegalese government's systematic option, starting in 1972, for the tertiary agricultural developments, with complete superintendence of water, both in the delta as well as in the Senegal and Faleme valleys.

This is why Senegal today takes as a basis the short- and medium-term program of action formulated in 1978-1979, a program whose objective on the 1989 horizon is to cultivate 70,000 hectares, developed and exploited in tertiary from the delta up to the Faleme. The program is all the more important for Senegal because it does not always cover the essential rice consumption with its rice production.

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CSO: 4400

SENEGAL

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL HARVESTING CAMPAIGNS--The council of ministers of Senegal on 21 April heard a communication from the minister of rural development which centered on the results of the 1979-1980 agricultural campaign and the preparations for the 1980-1981 agricultural campaign. For his part, the Senegalese prime minister, Mr Abdou Diouf emphasized in particular the necessity for preparing this campaign well through the implementation of all production factors and through the proper distribution of supplies like livestock feed. The head of government announced that seed distribution would begin on 25 April 1980 in the outlying regions and would progressively extend to the entire national territory. Lastly, the prime minister decided to postpone his official visits to the Diourbel and Louga regions until the end of the rainy season. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1036] 9181

DIOURBEL PEANUT PRODUCTION--Made up entirely of seeds judged suitable according to severe standards of germination, the Diourbel regional seed-bearing capital is fixed this year at 17,771 tons. This corresponds to the region's needs. According to Oncad [National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development], the verified production is about 72,000 tons as opposed to the 83,000 tons expected for the region. After the declaration of the regional seed-bearing capital and the security reserve supply, the evacuations for oil manufacturers is then about 55,005 tons, with evacuations to end before 15 June. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1036] 9181

ROAD FINANCING--The World Bank group just granted Senegal 38 million dollars in financing: an IDA (International Development Association) credit for 28 million dollars and a World Bank loan of 10 million dollars for a fourth road project will aid in keeping the country's road system in good condition and in improving the planning of road works. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1036] 9181

CSO: 4400

SEYCHELLES

PROGRESS OF REVOLUTION WEIGHED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 9-22 Jun 80 pp 37-39

[Article by San Fie: "Three Years Later"]

[Text] "You have just learned this morning that the Seychelles people have decided to overthrow the Mancham government and have asked me to form a new government. After having accepted, it is my duty to explain certain things to you so that you may first of all understand what has happened in the Seychelles and then have an idea of the way in which I intend to lead the country in the future (...). You will then understand why I have agreed to form that government, whose task it will be to work to improve the standard of living of the Seychelles people, a government that will guarantee the freedom of everyone...."

Immense Hope

Although charged with emotion, his voice was strong, the tone firm. On that Sunday, 5 June 1977, all the people of the Seychelles were listening to their young prime minister, France Albert Rene, the lawyer who had founded the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP), which had waged a bitter struggle for over 13 years to give the country real national independence. But while the constitutional conference in London in January 1976 did lead to recognition of the international sovereignty of the Seychelles, which was proclaimed on 29 June of that same year, the liberation struggle was thwarted, independence betrayed and freedom violated when James Mancham, who had been carried to the highest office, began to transform the 92 islands of this new nation into a place of pleasure, prostitution and corruption benefiting big international capitalists, Arab feudal princes, Western neocolonialism, South African and Israeli racists, fascists in Taiwan, Seoul and Saigon.

It is true that within the framework of the coalition government set up in June 1975, France Albert Rene became prime minister the day of independence, while retaining the portfolios of Public Works and Development, but it rapidly became apparent that Mancham intended to hold the true reins of power and was very anxious to be named president for life of the Seychelles. In the face of the determination of the playboy from Victoria to keep his country under neocolonial tutelage, the young patriots in the SPUP organized. They could not conceive, much less accept, that their fight should be diverted from its objectives, that their rightful place in the international arena should be stolen from them, that the role of their country, which occupies a particularly important strategic and geopolitical position in the Indian Ocean, should depend on the designs and ambitions of imperialism, and that their national resources should be in the hands of a privileged minority linked to the class interests of the Western powers, particularly Great Britain, France, the United States and their allies in Pretoria:

"The immense hope which independence had inspired among our people gradually gave way to bitterness, resignation, pessimism and despair," President France Albert Rene recently told us, "despite all the efforts of our party, which sought to keep the nation's live forces in a state of constant mobilization in order to protect its conquests and consolidate them.

"Our independence had been recognized, but that independence had actually only been granted, while its real content had been confiscated, diverted from the objectives that had nothing to do with the basic and legitimate interests of our people. Although small, our population has immense potential in all fields. Nothing could justify the continuation and worsening of the misery, poverty, exploitation and oppression of our people after independence unless our resources came back to our fellow countrymen. But when those resources are looted, our agriculture neglected, our resources and fishing left to the pirates of the seas, our education based on a system that grants its privileges only to those families with the means to pay for the schooling of their children, when the Seychellois cannot build a decent house because the banks refuse him loans, or when the hospitals are reserved for a minority, industry is neglected so as to favor that of the multinational companies, when our tourism imposes outrageous rates for transportation and hotels so that only a minority may profit from them, when there is no price control: Tell me how long you think a people can endure that servitude, that demi-slavery that independence was to eradicate, eliminate once and for all? Yes, you tell me how long!"

Campaign of Gossip

The Seychelles people did not even wait a year. Before the first anniversary of independence was celebrated -- 24 days, to be precise -- a group of revolutionaries from the SPUP expressing the overwhelming majority of the population, carried out the plan that had been worked out for months. The corrupt regime of James Mancham was ousted and the country embarked on the path of building a socialist society, side by side with the progressive and revolutionary regimes of the Third World, restoring at the same time its national and international dignity.

In less than 3 years -- under the leadership of the new political movement, the Seychellois People's Progressive Front (SPPF) -- the regime headed by France Albert Rene undertook vast domestic reforms and adopted consistent anti-imperialist positions that were particularly courageous for a country directly threatened by the hegemonic aims of Western powers and their allies. They were 3 years of far-reaching transformations but also great tests. All kinds of maneuvers and plots were hatched by imperialism and its agents in order to try to destabilize and overthrow the regime in South Africa and Reunion, they tried repeatedly [sic] to infiltrate the Seychelles cities in order to engage in espionage, perpetrate sabotage and make attacks on Seychelles leaders.

While local reactionaries seized the pretext of a national youth service project in order to stir up disturbances in the schools, a so-called Resistance Movement distributed thousands of tracts spreading the most fantastic rumors about political life in the Seychelles and the projects of Albert Rene's regime. Some went so far as to assert that the Seychelles were to proclaim a "communist regime" on 5 June 1980. Others claimed that President Albert Rene anticipated joining CEMA or the Warsaw Pact! The purpose of the gossip campaign, as the chief of state called it, was and is perfectly clear: to try to sow doubt about the country's progressive options, spread doubt and confusion within the SPPF and among the unalined friends and allies of the young republic.

The plots of the adversaries of Albert Rene's regime were intensified toward the end of last year. The chief of state's participation in the summit conference of nonalined nations in Havana, the brilliant speech he delivered on that occasion and the warm welcome he received from all the heads of the progressive regimes in the Third World were to precipitate the action of the enemies of Victoria. As early as 16 November, less than 2 months after the Havana summit conference, President Albert Rene revealed the dimensions of the plot hatched in order to overthrow his regime and the imminence of armed intervention against the Seychelles from Durban. At the same time, he announced that the elements involved in the conspiracy had sneaked into the country for the purpose of assassinating him and eliminating certain members of the government. Among those arrested was a Frenchman, Jacques Chevalereau, technical adviser to the police. On the day after his arrest, 12 French sailors on the Seychelles patrol boat the "Topaze" were forced to put ashore in Victoria because of their personal relations with the technical adviser arrested and other persons of Seychelles nationality who were also implicated. Despite the chief of state's attempts not to implicate the French Government directly in the plot, Paris reacted violently, recalling all the French sailors assigned to the Seychelles patrol boat, along with six technical advisers. Furthermore, it suspended aid amounting to 40 million rupees, which was to be used for construction of a cultural center, a hotel school and the affiliated hotel, and rock removal projects.

In the face of these provocations, the Seychelles regime took security measures, while remaining calm. The decisions made were even aimed at reducing tension in its relations with Paris. It expelled Jacques Chevalereau in February, despite confessions he had made about his participation in preparation of the conspiracy at the local and international levels, and it went so far as to ask President Giscard d'Estaing to send to the Seychelles an official from the French Police to verify the truth of the proof leading to the arrest of Chevalereau. Elysee did not react to the suggestion from the Seychelles chief of state, but relations between the two countries now seem to be improving. In fact, two cooperation agreements concerning financial aid to scientific research in the fields of fishing and agriculture were recently signed in Victoria between Jacques Hodoul, head of Seychelles diplomacy, and French Ambassador Francis Dore. Could this improvement in relations be the result, as some diplomatic observers in Victoria seem to think, to the drilling operations about to be undertaken in Seychelles waters by an American oil company? Is there not increasing talk of the likelihood of large oil deposits off the coast of the Seychelles as in Madagascar, to which the World Bank has just granted a loan of $12.5 million to finance research?

Whatever the case, since his spectacular "entry" at the Sixth Summit Conference of Nonalined Nations in September, the chief of state and most of his ministers and diplomats have taken up their pilgrim's staffs and embarked upon a series of trips to all the continents for the purpose of consolidating the country's independence, first of all, and second, developing its economic, financial and cultural relations. Without in any way denying the progressive options which Albert Rene forcefully emphasized in Havana, Seychelles leaders have made junkets to most of the world's capitals to conclude important and particularly beneficial agreements.

The last visit which the Seychelles chief of state made to New Delhi is proof of this. Following long meetings with the Indian chief of state and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, President Albert Rene signed numerous economic agreements for tens of millions of rupees, without thereby neglecting international problems affecting world peace and particularly the Indian Ocean. As he clearly stated to his Indian interlocutors, the Seychelles chief of state's position on certain crucial questions remains unchanged: the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland, denunciation of the Camp David accords, recognition of the Saharan Arab Republic, unswerving condemnation of South Africa, support for the liberation of Namibia, a new world economic order, demilitarization of the Indian Ocean and the elimination of all foreign bases from the region. But he went even further in clarifying his thoughts, on the Afghanistan affair, for example. It was his minister of foreign affairs who explained: "The problem, as India and the Seychelles see it," he said, "is that the Afghan Government has requested military assistance from the Soviet Union. Consequently, although everyone would like to see the Soviet troops leave Afghanistan one day, the countries in the region should first of all guarantee the security of that nation as a sine qua non condition. This would also include a guarantee on the part of nations in the region according to which powers from outside the region would not use their territories against Afghanistan. Countries in the region should create conditions making it possible for Soviet troops to leave Afghanistan, which would enjoy complete security. Having said this much, India and the Seychelles condemn the events in Afghanistan and Iran as pretexts for stepping up the presence of military forces in the Indian Ocean...."

The same concern for respecting the commitments made on 5 June 1977 motivates the chief of state with respect to the "need for doing away with neocolonial structures" from the country and establishing a just society. In the field of education, for example, the entire country has been mobilized to democratize the system that prevailed before the takeover by Albert Rene. Minister of Education and Information James Michel has set up a national system of education and training whose guidelines express the determination to ensure equal access to education for all Seychelles children and the elimination of discriminatory social barriers inherited from the system existing when the country was liberated on 5 June 1977. Despite the difficulties and limitations found in the field of education, a whole series of measures has been adopted aimed at expanding facilities for children of school age, thanks to the construction of many nursery schools, new schools and the recruitment of qualified teachers. The national system of education as outlined depends on preschool preparation in nurseries for 2 years, the establishment of elementary education for 9 years and universal access to professional or technical secondary education and university education.

No Manipulation

The health department, a sector that totally ignored the poor, has been totally modified over the past 3 years by the abolition of private consultations, decentralization of the medical system thanks to the establishment of well-equipped medical centers in all districts and the elimination of discrimination that favored urban regions. As for the productive sectors, Albert Rene is optimistic and confident: "The 5-year plan emphasizes the promotion of investments in the areas of fishing, agriculture and light industries. Naturally, our success depends to a large extent on our ability to mobilize the necessary capital, but we unreservedly reject all aid from developed countries aimed at manipulating Third World countries so as to try to reestablish a new form of colonialism. That is why we are turning more to the relatively wealthy developing countries, where we have found sympathy and understanding with regard to our development plans. Those who try to use aid in order to manipulate us must understand that independence is the inherent right of every nation, whatever its population, area or wealth. Until this reality is accepted and respected, we shall continue to live in a world torn by the conflicts and rivalries of all those who seek selfish economic advantages...."

For ever 200 years, the Seychelles people endured the French, then the British, colonial yoke. When they gained independence, on 29 June 1976, their president, James Mancham, tried to keep the nation in the same state of dependency and neocolonial domination. Humiliated, isolated, cut off from the camp to which it was irresistibly drawn, the push toward liberation was inevitable. The chains the people were to break on 5 June 1977 with the takeover by the young SPUP revolutionaries were those of political, economic, social and cultural slavery.

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

TANZANIA-ZAMBIA RAILWAY REORGANIZATION--Steps making it possible to correct the deficit financial situation of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) were made public on 20 May in Dar es Salaam. They call for the export via the Tanzania-Zambia railroad of a minimum of 40,000 tons of Zambian copper and 5,000 tons of zinc and lead per month, and the speedier rotation of freight cars in Zambia, such as to achieve the goal of 1.2 million tons of goods transported annually. According to Tanzanian Minister for Communications and Transport Augustine Mwingira, these measures are to be studied in the course of the next meeting of the TAZARA board of directors in Kitwe, Zambia, on 25 May. The minister also said that the TAZARA now has 97 locomotives, with the purchase of 12 from China last December. It will be recalled that we reported on the difficulties experienced by the TAZARA in our 23 May 1980 issue, page 1220. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 May 80 p 1276] 5157

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